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Chapter 1 - Introduction to Moral Dilemmas and
Consistency
The term “moral dilemma” has a number of uses in common and
philosophical speech. This project is not concerned with the common use of “moral
dilemma” to describe situations where it is difficult to determine what is the right
thing to do, or where morality conflicts with pragmatic concerns. Those situations
are interesting in terms of their impact on applications of ethics, but I am more
concerned here with dilemmas of a different sort. A moral dilemma, as I use the
term, is a situation in which an agent has an obligation to do some action A and an
obligation to do some action B but cannot perform both actions. In particular, I am
interested in answering the following question: Is it possible for a consistent moral
theory to produce genuine dilemmas?
I will clarify just what I mean by “genuine dilemmas.” It should be
uncontroversial to say that many moral theories give prima facie dilemmas,
situations where an agent has two prima facie obligations that stand in conflict to
one another. These situations are typically resolved with a sort of moral calculus.
One obligation is often seen as stronger or more urgent than the other, and so the
morally correct course of action is to satisfy the superseding duty. A genuine
dilemma, then, is an all-things-considered dilemma. In other words, a situation
qualifies as a genuine moral dilemma when it involves a conflict between two allthings-considered obligations. In these cases, neither obligation can be discharged
by appeal to the other or by any external factors.
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All-things-considered dilemmas are called “genuine” because they present a
more serious challenge to a moral theory than do prima facie dilemmas. It is to be
expected that any theory that posits certain general obligations, like the obligation
not to kill or the obligation to keep one’s promises, will admit some situations where
two or more of these obligations are in apparent conflict. For example, a soldier who
is ordered to attack and kill his enemy faces a prima facie dilemma under any theory
that posits a duty not to kill and a duty to follow orders from legitimate authority.
Most plausible theories will include a system for analyzing such cases, and many
will involve a preference in priority between the two duties. More pacifist theories
will tell the soldier it is permissible to disobey his orders when those orders
demand he commit wrong (especially violent) acts. Some other theories will value
honoring contracts and authority more highly, and allow that the soldier suspend
his duty not to kill when the killing is justified (in this case by obeisance to
legitimate authority).
There are some theories, however, that would say of the above case that
neither action is right. The soldier has an obvious responsibility not to kill other
people. He also has a genuine duty to follow orders, especially since he has entered
into a contract with his government to do so in all circumstances. If a theory does
not include a method for deciding between conflicting obligations in every possible
case, it will admit some genuine dilemmas. In the soldier’s case, he will do wrong no
matter which choice he makes.
I will now turn to the other most important feature of this project:
Consistency in ethical theories. Theories that admit genuine dilemmas strike many
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as logically inconsistent. Kant said in The Metaphysics of Morals that “a conflict of
duties and obligations is inconceivable” (17). Of course, Kant has had direct
influence on many moral theorists since, and a large number continue to echo this
sentiment. The idea that a consistent basis for generating ethical duties can give rise
to conflicting obligations seems strange. Several contemporary thinkers have
defended dilemma-producing theories, however, including Ruth Barcan Marcus and
Bernard Williams. For both of them and many others, the argument hinges on
consistency. The question remains, then, of what exactly one means when one says
that a theory is consistent or inconsistent.
When one creates a moral theory, it has a particular structure. The theory
begins with certain moral principles, a “moral code” as Marcus calls it (123). These
principles give general duties and permissions. They require generic agents to fulfill
certain obligations at whatever time the situations arise. Principles may also be
conditional, in which case they apply only to those agents who meet certain criteria.
For example, parents may be morally required to provide for their children where
others are not. These principles are something like mathematical equations with
unassigned variables, and correct moral action will satisfy the principles for every
relevant assignment of agent, time, place, and context for action.
Theories consist (at least in part) of a moral code and its rules of application.
For example, a utilitarian theory has just one fundamental principle: Agents must
act to maximize utility (which will be defined differently under different versions of
the theory). The rules of application are that in any situation, an agent should prefer
a course of action with greater resultant utility. In cases where two actions have
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equal utility, the choice is a matter of indifference. Other theories may have
somewhat more complicated formulations, but this structure is close to universal
for theories of morality that hinge on action. Theories of moral character and virtue
will differ somewhat, as they are often not prescriptive theories per se.
Given this structure for moral theories, the reader may see how a description
of consistency follows. An agent considers the correct application of the moral code,
and rules a theory inconsistent if this application results in a logical contradiction
(in a properly defined logical system). This is a weak test for consistency of any sort
of theory. Arguments for inconsistency are done ad absurdum. The skeptic assumes
the theory is correct and shows that its application yields an impossible result. This
shows that the theory’s foundation is faulty and must be revised or abandoned. Less
formal interpretations of “consistent” apply in some situations, but I will restrict my
use to this more rigorous sense of the term.
How does this impact my talk of dilemmas? The opponent of theories that
allow dilemmas will wish to dismiss them by this process. The argument will
assume that a generic dilemma occurs, and show by application of certain
incontrovertible principles that a contradiction follows. When I use phrases like
“opponent of dilemmas” or “defender of dilemmas” throughout this project, I mean
those who fall on one or the other side of the debate about the consistency of
dilemma-admitting theories. In order to argue for either side of this issue, one must
have a system for formalizing ethical claims. In the next chapter, I will discuss that
endeavor in depth. Following that, I will give the two most compelling arguments
attempting to show dilemma-producing theories to be inconsistent. Both of these
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arguments will rely on certain axioms of normative logic, representing principles
fundamental to any plausible moral theory. I will argue in some cases that the
principles are not in fact necessary to represent a normative reasoning. In the other
case, I will show that the axiom in question does not apply to the relevant situations.
Before I dive into the problem of symbolization and formal argument, however, I
will discuss in greater depth the history of moral dilemmas and certain efforts to
show by conceptual argument whether they are possible.
One of the earliest often-cited examples of a moral dilemma comes in Plato.
In the Republic, he proposes a response to a possible definition of right action.
“Truthfulness and giving back anything one has borrowed from someone,”
according to Plato, is an inadequate characterization (331c). Socrates, Plato’s
mouthpiece in the text, considers the case where he borrows a weapon from a
friend. Before he returns the weapon, he learns that his friend has gone insane, and
so will likely do significant harm with the returned weapon (Plato 331c). In this
situation, Socrates faces something of a dilemma. He can honor his promise, as
Simonides’ stipulated definition of “justice” would require. If he does so, however,
he will be indirectly responsible for his friend’s wrong actions. He will certainly be
culpable if we believe he has an obligation to prevent whatever harm his friend will
do. On the other hand, if he does not return the weapon, he will clearly be breaking a
promise, which Simonides and most modern thinkers accept is at least prima facie
wrong. Plato believes this situation, at least, is not an example of a genuine dilemma.
Rather, he believes it is fairly plain that Socrates must break his promise, and so the
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case refutes Simonides’ conception of justice. I think most would be inclined to
agree.
Socrates’ case represents the fairly common practice of referring to any
situation of a complex or difficult moral nature as a dilemma. Under some theories,
Socrates would in fact be facing a genuine dilemma, but many thinkers prior to the
mid-twentieth century maintained that any such situation would admit of a right
choice. That is, any apparently dilemmatic case can be analyzed away when one
discover which of the duties took precedence. These situations are often quite
dramatic, earning the title “tragic dilemmas.” One need not look far in classical
literature for such a case. Perhaps the most popular example is that of Agamemnon’s
choice to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia. He is presented with the following
dilemma: He intends to sail his fleet, but the winds are dead. He discovers that the
goddess Artemis has stopped them from blowing because he has slighted her. He
can only restore the winds if he sacrifices Iphigenia. If he does not do so, he will
betray his promise to aid Menelaus in recapturing Helen (Euripides).
Agamemnon’s case is certainly tragic in every sense of the word. He is forced
to choose between his honor and his daughter, and in the end he does indeed choose
to sacrifice Iphigenia. Oddly, to the modern reader this seems clearly to be the
wrong choice. One would hope that Agamemnon valued his daughter’s life more
highly than his promise to wage war over Menelaus’ pride. Again, this case seems
less to reflect a dilemma in moral terms, but rather to showcase how moral duties
often conflict with other important considerations, such as personal honor. These
sorts of situations are different from genuine moral dilemmas, but their use in
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classical examples of morality is important. A preoccupation with apparent
dilemmas of the sort that appear in Plato’s and Euripides’ works may have had some
effect on the frequent dismissal of dilemmas as an important concern for moral
theory. The most common examples of dilemmas are not real examples, in that they
do not seem to pose a choice between two equally weighty obligations. In these
situations, two prima facie duties conflict, but there is little ground in either case to
argue that neither obligation can be overridden.
Despite their apparent moral simplicity, these classical cases are noticeably
at odds with a particular sort of morality that is actually quite popular in modern
ethical theory. Kantian ethics is founded upon the notion that a single moral rule
(the Categorical Imperative) can be applied to determine the moral status of any
considered action. The unity of this rule is paramount. According to Kant, the
Imperative, which is given in terms of several formulations, is just one rule
presented in various equivalent forms (Cureton and Johnson 9). Since Kant believes
moral truths to be matter of necessity, he rejects the notion that any two duties can
conflict, even if one is more pressing and overrides the other (Timmerman 40-41). A
necessary truth cannot be shown false by appeal to other facts or truths, as would
be the case if one allowed certain moral truths to override others (according to
Kant). Under a strict Kantian view, even prima facie dilemmas may be inadmissible,
since the application of the Categorical Imperative must not yield mixed results. A
correct application of the Imperative should always perfectly guide action. That is to
say, the strict Kantian will insist that in every situation a course will be available
which satisfies the Categorical Imperative.
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What might the Kantian say about Socrates’ and Agamemnon’s cases? Most
likely, she would argue that in neither case is there a conflict even of general
principles. Since Kant’s Categorical Imperative is a unified founding principle for his
moral theory, it seems intuitive that it should never generate conflicts of duties. One
may be inclined to say that a consistent ethical principle should not yield conflicting
results. In particular, if one accepts Kant’s claim that a conflict of morality is
rationally impossible, it should be straightforward to say that any apparent dilemma
will be a result of mistaken reasoning on the agent’s part (when they reason using
the Categorical Imperative). One may internalize certain general guidelines for right
action, but upon carefully considering a situation, the Imperative should always
leave at least one acceptable course of action. Since a single principle provides a
complete moral guide, correct application of the principle will always give correct
moral answers. Taken together with Kant’s insistence that duties cannot conflict,
this means that the Categorical Imperative must never return a dilemmatic result. If
one accepts this, then neither Socrates nor Agamemnon faces a conflict even of
general moral principles. Kantian ethics gives only one ultimate principle, so one
cannot say that two or more principles conflict with one taking precedence. Rather,
the apparent conflict is only with the agent’s mistaken application of the Imperative.
Of course, Kantian theory must make room for the possibility of complex and
difficult moral situations. Mark Timmons maintains that instances of prima facie
conflict are in fact possible on the right interpretation of Kant. He presents the
following situation:
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Lizbeth’s Lie: Lizbeth is hiding an acquaintance, Tom, who is wrongly
believed by some murderous gang members to have ratted out one of the
gang to the police. A gang member shows up at Lizbeth’s front door asking
her for the whereabouts of Tom. To tell the truth would surely lead to the
murder of Tom, and so would (let us suppose) just refusing to answer. So
Lizbeth lies, saying that she doesn’t know where Tom is (Timmons 218).
One of the most straightforward duties generated by the Categorical
Imperative is the obligation not to lie. The first formulation of the Imperative gives a
test for an action’s moral status: If the agent can will their action as a universal
maxim in a rational universe and could rationally take that same action in that
universe, the action is permissible (Cureton and Johnson 5). If one wills a universe
in which lying is a universal law (that is, everyone lies all the time), it would be
irrational to lie about Tom’s whereabouts, since the gangster would never believe
the lie. Thus, Lizbeth has a duty not to lie. On the other hand, Kantian ethics includes
a duty to promote others’ happiness (Timmons 214). Protecting Tom’s life seems
quite a weak result of protecting his happiness, so Lizbeth also has a duty not to
reveal his location and facilitate his murder. The potential conflict of duties is
obvious. It is intuitively obvious that Lizbeth acts rightly when she lies to protect
Tom, so in this case one duty takes precedence. Timmons gives what he thinks
would be Kant’s reasoning for the choice. A duty does not override another based on
the strength of the obligations, but rather based on the strength of the grounds
generating the obligations (Timmons 218). In this case, there are grounds for an
obligation not to lie and grounds for an obligation to rescue Tom. Timmons
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maintains that the grounds for the obligation to save Tom are stronger, and
therefore one obligation obtains, while the other fails to apply.
It seems Kantian theory must have some way to explain the apparent conflict
of such fundamental principles as those at play in Timmons’ example. Timmons’
own proposed reading of Kant seems quite reasonable, and it allows the Kantian to
grant what seems so obvious intuitively: There are situations in which an agent will
have two moral duties in conflict, although one or the other of the duties may be
overridden. If this is the case, what becomes of the notion that a single unified
principle must not give conflicting results? The answer to this will have implications
for other moral theories, such as utilitarianism. Maximizing utility is another
singular moral principle, and so it is subject to much the same intuition at play in the
case of Kantian ethics.
It seems now that this intuition runs into some problems, however. It will be
helpful to consider contemporary theories with more than one founding principle.
In pluralist moral theories, “a plurality of equally basic morally relevant features”
must be considered when evaluating an action’s moral status (Timmons 246). These
theories differ in some important ways from monistic theories, like Kantian or
utilitarian ethics. Nonetheless, they are subject to many of the same general
considerations.
Just what is a pluralistic theory? I am concerned specifically with what is
called “foundational pluralism” (Mason 1.1). This is the view that a correct moral
theory will not be founded upon a single unifying theory of value. Rather, actions
and outcomes are assigned value in reference to a number of metrics. For example,
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Judith Jarvis Thomson argues that all judgments of goodness (i.e. of value) really
evaluate “goodness in a way,” that is to say by reference to some particular
paradigm of value (276). No objective property of goodness exists on this view.
Where Kant’s and similar views appeal to a singular unified notion of value, a
pluralistic view will maintain that no such unity holds for genuine moral reasoning.
Rather, moral agents do and should appeal to different sources or types of value in
their different judgments of moral value and status.
The most pertinent feature of moral theories to my present project is
consistency. A theory of any sort will be unsatisfactory if it is found to be logically
inconsistent, and inconsistency is the most common charge against moral theories
that admit dilemmas. The worry arising from Kant’s discussion of conflict is related
to consistency. If a single foundational principle (like the Categorical Imperative)
produces dilemmas, it at least gives the impression of inconsistency. It is not clear
that such a situation actually implies a logical contradiction, however. On that strict
use of “consistency,” the status of dilemmas remains to be seen. As I will argue in
later chapters, dilemmas’ existence only generates a logical contradiction if certain
questionable axioms are adopted. These axioms will not hold in some plausible
moral theories, so they must not be taken as fundamental to an ethical logic. In that
case, producing dilemmas should not be taken as a sign of a theory’s inconsistency,
unless the theory’s own conceptual principles would suggest that dilemmas are
inadmissible. Monistic theories may or may not have this last feature, but the
intuition remains that a unified moral principle should guide action perfectly. By

12
examining pluralistic theories, one can discover why it might be that even a monistic
theory might admit dilemmas without rendering itself inconsistent.
Do we have the same anti-dilemmatic intuitions about pluralistic theories?
There are two ways to approach a pluralistic moral theory. On the one hand, one
could view the various foundational principles as completely separate from one
another for all theoretic purposes. For example, if I have a duty to care for my
family, that duty may be entirely separate from my duty to lessen the suffering of
distant strangers. I could very well have both obligations, and they would
presumably be at odds in some situations. Another way to approach pluralistic
moral theories would be to say that such a theory resembles a monistic theory in
many ways. The agent might then treat the set of foundational principles as a single
conjunctive principle. Instead of a collection of separate principles or systems of
value, the theory’s basis is represented as a number of ways in which the single
property of goodness manifests itself. The Categorical Imperative itself may be read
this way. If one does not take Kant quite at face value when he claims that the
formulations of the Imperative are strictly identical, it is plausible to claim that each
formulation of the Imperative is in fact a different fundamental principle. Together
they capture a unified system of value, which merely shows itself in several different
action-guiding rules. It is taken as a single unified moral law, which will give
different guidance in different situations based on its constituent sub-principles.
Each of these two interpretations of a pluralist theory will involve different attitudes
toward dilemmas.
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The first, more genuinely pluralistic view is often friendly to conflicts of duty,
even to genuine dilemmas. A popular example comes from Jean-Paul Sartre. A
student’s brother is killed in the German offensive (in France) in 1940. The student
wishes to avenge his brother’s death and fight the Nazi forces, whom he rightly
considers evil. However, he lives with his aging mother, and he is her only joy in life
(McConnell 1). If we accept the implicit stipulation that both of these desires have
moral motivation, a dilemma arises. The student has a duty to care for his mother,
but he may also have a duty to fight against the oppressive and evil Nazis. Under this
description, it seems he has two different types of obligation. He has a familial
obligation, with “limited scope but certain efficacy” to provide comfort to his mother
(McConnell 1). He also has perhaps a nobler but also more ambitious duty to join a
fight that may save millions of lives from persecution. If the student accepts a moral
theory that closely resembles common sense morality, he will likely accept both of
these duties. Given Sartre’s use of the case, it seems these are completely distinct
principles of morality. In that case, at least a prima facie dilemma obtains. It may be
possible to assign a weight to the conflicting principles, in which case a genuine
dilemma would not arise. Rather, the student would follow the obligation whose
motivating principle was stronger. It is not clear that either the duty to fight tyrants
and murderers or the duty to care for one’s family will take precedence in every
case, however, so it is difficult to say one of the principles lends its generated duties
greater weight than the other. If that were the case, a genuine dilemma would arise.
Whatever the student does, he will fail to follow one of the other genuine moral
principle.

14
When one considers an apparent dilemma in a conjunctively-founded moral
theory, the situation more closely resembles Kant’s considerations. Similarly to
Lizbeth’s case, Sartre’s student applies his moral principle to determine what to do
in this situation. Instead of testing his choices against a single rule, he checks each
possible action against each conjunct in his conjunctive theory. As in Lizbeth’s case,
he discovers that both options open to him are required by at least one conjunct.
Thus, he faces a potential dilemma. As in the above case, he may resolve the
situation by weighing his sub-principles against one another and deciding which is
more pressing or more powerful. This approach may run into the same problems I
mentioned in the previous paragraph, since the principles in question still do not
present an obvious choice. In any event, the approach of treating a pluralist theory
as a conjunctive monistic theory presents the same apparent problem of
consistency.
It seems intuitive to say that a theory with multiple founding principles is
really based on all those principles taken together. If there is to be any test for
inconsistency in the theory as a whole, it will certainly consider all the principles
together. That is to say, a pluralistic theory will be treated as conjunctive if it is to be
taken as a single theory at all. Even in a theory like Thomson’s, which is based on a
plurality of types of value, one might focus on those actions and outcome which
have some moral component, treating the various reference frames of goodness as
subtypes of moral value. In any case where one cannot make this move, it will be
reasonable to say that the object in question is not really a single theory but multiple
theories of morality, and separate theories need not be mutually consistent.
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It seems that in Sartre’s case, a genuine conflict of principles arises. The
conflict may be ultimately prima facie, it is much harder to see the right course than
in most of my previous examples of prima facie dilemmas. What does this mean for
the consistency of moral theories on the whole? I have argued that any pluralistic
theory will be conjunctive if it is to be a single theory at all. In that case, pluralistic
theories resemble monistic theories in several ways, especially in terms of testing
consistency. As such, it would be reasonable to expect that one sort of theory will
admit dilemmas if the other does, at least if we take “admits dilemmas” to mean
“does not imply a contradiction when dilemmas are posited.” It is clear that
pluralistic theories admit prima facie dilemmas, so monistic theories may do the
same without danger of rendering themselves inconsistent. In the end, the question
comes down whether in situations of apparent conflict one duty can always be given
preference over the other.
Kantian theory and many pluralistic theories share a certain form. They
mostly fall into the category of deontological ethical theories. Typically, these
theories involve mandates about types of action (such as lying or saving a life),
rather than giving a principle that applies straightforwardly to every specific action.
Utilitarianism takes the latter route. This differentiates it from other theories. The
principle of maximizing utility (or good consequences) is not a restriction on certain
types of action. Rule utilitarianism will more closely resemble a pluralistic theory in
this regard, since it selects those guiding principles that give the best utilitarian
results. The only situation resembling a dilemma that will arise for a strict act
utilitarian is one in which no unique maximum of good consequences exists.
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Assuming an agent has finitely many courses open to them at any given decision
point, this means that two or more actions share the same utility value. In that case,
consequentialists are generally happy to leave the choice between the maximizing
actions up to non-moral factors. As long as the agent takes one of the courses with
the most positive result, the choice between those actions is a matter of indifference.
Thus, dilemmas do not arise, because there will never be a situation in which an
agent must take action A and must take action B, but cannot take both in
conjunction. The theory is designed to accommodate such cases by saying that when
the principle of maximal utility generates two incompatible obligations, the agent is
only required to take one or the other of the actions, and there is no moral reason to
choose one over the other.
The theories I have discussed thus far are examples of what Ruth Barcan
Marcus calls “ethical formalism” (124). She differentiates these theories from ethical
intuitionism. Formalism maintains that a sound moral theory consists of a set of
principles that apply to specific cases. Morally analyzing a decision point involves
testing the available actions against the principle or principles underlying the moral
theory. An intuitionist theory, on the other hand, will maintain that no set of
principles and rules of application can adequately capture moral reasoning (Marcus
124). The moral intuitionist denies that dilemmas can be solved by appeal to a strict
ordering of fundamental principles, since he will deny that any such ordering is
possible. Rational intuition about specific cases is the final arbiter of moral status,
while theoretic principles provide prima facie moral reasons.
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From this it follows that when application of principles gives a dilemma, it is
only a prima facie dilemma. According to Marcus, the intuitionist will maintain that
such a situation can be resolved by recognizing the conflict is “epistemological and
not ontological” (124). The apparent dilemma is a matter of uncertainty, rather than
a genuine conflict of obligations. Intuitionist theories need not be concerned with
consistency in the same way formalist theories are. The intuitionist does not accept
that morality arises out of the application of fundamental principles, so there is
nothing in an intuitionist theory to call inconsistent. One may reason wrongly about
cases, but this is often a case of incomplete knowledge, or of taking heuristic
principles too seriously. Intuitionist and formalist theorists differ in their approach
to dismissing dilemmas, but historically most theories have been unwilling to accept
genuine dilemmas into their moral ontology.
A number of moral theories do not admit dilemmas on the grounds that
doing so would render the theory inconsistent. This stems largely from an intuition
that consistent principles will not give rise to conflicts. However, most plausible
theories present agents somewhat regularly with prima facie dilemmas. In other
words, consistent bases for morality frequently generate conflicts of duty when
every duty is taken to be equally pressing. In that case, what remains is to determine
whether every theory can be organized such that its founding principles are ordered
according to moral strength, or perhaps to elaborate on basic principles to account
for potential dilemmas. Another option would be to adopt an intuitionist theory.
Either of these approaches may dismiss the problem of dilemmas, but it is not clear
for many theories whether their founding principles or general duties can be
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plausibly ordered, and intuitionism runs into a number of problems, which I will not
discuss at length here. It is enough that it now seems plausible that dilemmas may
not be as problematic as they first seem. I will now proceed to give a general
account of the formalization of ethical claims, called “deontic logic,” and then to
discuss the two most widely-discussed and most compelling formal arguments for
the inconsistency of dilemma-producing theories. In both cases, I will argue against
the principles used in the argument, or at least in their relevance to dilemmas.
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Chapter 2 - Introduction to Deontic Logic

I will begin here with a discussion of deontic logic generally. I am aiming for
the reader’s grasping the basic concepts used in the few proofs I will give, so this
will be a very simplified account of a complicated subject, with an eye toward
understanding the semantic and interpretive elements rather than the more
technical aspects. “Deontic logic” refers to formal symbolic systems used to
represent normative statements. The field of deontic logic has developed largely as
an adaptation of modal logical systems. As the name suggests, modal logic attempts
to formalize and understand claims of possibility and necessity. Deontic logicians
developed parallel systems to capture normative reasoning, especially in arguments
about ethics. It has important applications in understanding the structure and
relationships of ethical obligations. Deontic logic is of particular interest to the
project at hand, since I am concerned with the logical status of dilemmas across all
plausible moral theories. The correct approach to this problem is to consider which
formal axioms must be admitted into any normative logic and determine the status
of dilemmas under the axioms.
The first question to raise is this: Why do we need deontic logic in the first
place? How does it improve our understanding and reasoning about ethics (and
normativity more broadly)? The primary motivation matches that behind any
logical system. By developing formal rules for reasoning about norms, one is better
able to reach correct inferences in normative arguments. A formally defined
symbolic system will allow statements of ethical duties and permissions to be
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paraphrased into schemata, which are subject to well-defined rules of inference. In a
useful system, nearly every statement in ethics will have a paraphrase. Thus,
argument can be handled formally, with a clear decision process for determining
validity. It should also be noted that such a system must capture normative claims in
a way first-order logic cannot. Imperative statements are not propositions, of
course, and so it is not possible in many cases to accurately paraphrase an ethical
argument relying on the notion of moral imperative into first-order logic. A
semantic system will be required which reflects normative force.
In particular, the project of developing deontic logic is the project of
capturing implication, mutual incompatibility, and similar notions as they pertain to
imperatives. Deontic logic is used almost exclusively as a logic of ethics, but in
principle it should apply to any normative system. In this way, the fundamental
principles of deontic logic are prior to ethical theory. Deontic logic captures
imperatives and normative value as a whole, and those statements that are logically
valid in the system will be those that are true because of the nature of normative
statements. No particular obligations or permissions will be derivable as theorems
in the logic, because these rely on specific conceptual parts of ethics. Rather, any
ethical theory will introduce certain additional principles to the fundamental ones.
These basic axioms of a deontic system represent principles of normativity without
which a set of norms would be unintelligible or deeply inconsistent.
A formal deontic system will help with theoretical reasoning about the
nature of ethics and norms, but it also enables deeper analysis of applied ethics. A
clear formal logic should help to clear up problems involving counter-to-duty or
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secondary obligations Consider the following case: You pass by a pond in which a
man is drowning. Due to your fear of water, you cannot bring yourself to jump in
and save the man. In this situation, you have presumably violated a moral duty. If
one is able to save another’s life at minimal risk to oneself, one should do so. It is
clear that you have an obligation to call for help, given that you will not jump in to
save the man yourself. Certain logical questions arise when considering counter-toduty imperatives such as this, however. In this case, our intuition is clear that one
must do whatever one can (perhaps without seriously endangering oneself) to
rescue the drowning man, hence the obligation to dive into the pond. Presumably,
the non-ideal agent is still obligated to save the man, but they are unwilling. In that
case, another obligation arises, now to ensure his rescue by someone willing and
able. The intuitive solution is obvious, but in formal argument it does well to be able
to challenge and confirm intuitions. A carefully designed deontic logic will
accommodate analysis and explanation of obligations that arise in non-ideal
situations. Indeed, this is one of the central issues of deontic modality. I will discuss
this particular semantics of deontic logic shortly.
The above example leads me to a more theoretical reason for introducing
deontic logic. The methods involved in creating and applying such a logical system
will give significant insight into the structure and nature of specific obligations. In
the drowning-man example, the obligation to call for help is secondary to the
obligation to save the man. Logical analysis illuminates the relationships between
interdependent and counter-to-duty obligations. A logic specific to ethics will avoid
the problems with conditionals that result from relying strictly on first-order logic.
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This use should extend beyond counter-to-duty situations, and address several
apparent puzzles in intuitive moral reasoning.
Consider a case in which a person is voting to elect a mayor for their city. One
candidate has promised to allocate funds for the improvement of education and
healthcare. This candidate is known to be trustworthy. The other candidate has
made some vague promises about cutting taxes and supporting business, but has a
dubious record of fulfilling promises and has presented no clear plan. The first
candidate would clearly be preferable, but whether the matter comes down to a
moral obligation is not obvious at first glance. It would be in line with intuition to
say that voting for a better candidate is morally required, but from where exactly
does that obligation arise? In this case, it will not be out of violation of some primary
duty, but rather a specific application of a more general duty. Perhaps we believe
that we have an obligation to maximize our fellow citizens’ well-being, or at least to
ensure that our and others’ tax dollars are not misappropriated by a crooked mayor.
In either case, a general obligation to pursue some good or prevent some evil may
generate a duty to make a certain mark on a certain piece of paper. To determine
whether such a duty arises, one would consider the general obligation in question
and apply rules of inference to determine whether, given the facts about expected
outcomes and applicability of moral requirements to specific types of action (in this
case, voting), and then decide whether or not one has a genuine ethical obligation to
vote for one candidate or the other.
By generalizing this process, a theorist may understand a little better the
mechanisms by which duties give rise to one another. In an uncertain case, the
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argument for a certain obligation can be given in formal terms and examined for
validity and soundness. One of the most powerful tools in this situation will be
argument by contradiction. A common argumentative tactic is to assume one’s
opponent is correct, or that a certain action is required, and then demonstrate that
the situation would lead to a logically impossible result. For this to work in the
moral case, a thinker must understand just what constitutes a normative
contradiction. It will not be as straightforward as “p & ~p”, as one might hope. A
more robust logical system will be required. Once a theorist has the tools to apply
strict, decidable rules to arguments, he or she will be able to give more certain
accounts of the specific obligations of individual actors. In short, a system of deontic
logic will dispel a great deal of faulty reasoning from ethical discourse, since it will
both require and increase clarity and agreement at least in methods of inference. A
keener understanding of the logical structure of moral claims may also engender a
more structured approach to their metaphysical status. As I will discuss in greater
detail as I consider specific systems for deontic logic, the axioms and theorems we
admit into a system will depend on and inform how we think about the nature of
norms, and especially how norms relate to one another and to our own actions.
With these motivations in mind, I will now turn to the workings of deontic
logic itself. Deontic logic is closely related to modal logic in both its history and
construction. Modal logic deals with claims of possibility, necessity, and
contingency, called “alethic modality.” Where first-order logic is able to capture
reasoning only about real things and events, modal systems can paraphrase
arguments from counterfactual claims. It also allows one to distinguish between
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necessary truths and those that hold only contingently. For example, in first-order
logic, the paraphrase for, “Every bachelor is unmarried” will not be logically valid.
Using “Bx” for “x is a bachelor” and “Mx” for “x is married,” the paraphrase looks like
this: “(∀x)(Bx ⊃ ~Mx).” This schema will require premises to be proven true, and it
is no logically different than the statement “All ravens are black.” That is to say, the
notation and syntax do not indicate any difference between logically true and
contingently true statements. To solve this problem, we introduce new operators
“£A” for “A holds necessarily” and “¯A” for “A is possible” (Girle 3). Then, we can
say “£(∀x)(Bx ⊃ ~Mx),” which means “All bachelors are necessarily unmarried.”
The modal operator allows one to indicate that this proposition holds under all
possible contingent states of affairs.
I will clarify this last statement somewhat and briefly describe the formal
semantics behind modal logic. The standard model is called “Kripke semantics,”
though in actuality it was developed in parallel by a number of logicians in the midtwentieth century (Wolenski 273). The principle is that the operators quantify over
possible worlds, or universal states of affairs. The necessity operator is interpreted
as “in all possible worlds.” Thus, any state of affairs that holds necessarily is said to
hold across all possible worlds. Similarly, the possibility operator says “in some
possible world,” so that “¯A” means the same as “~£~A.” “A” holds in some
possible world if and only if “~A” does not hold in every possible world. There is an
important notion in the development and use of modal logics called a “world access
relation.” This relation allows one to adapt these logical systems to various types of
modality. One might be concerned with causal, rather than logical possibility, for
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example. I will not delve too deeply into the specifics of this relation and its
properties. Though it is important to a nuanced grasp of modal logic, I am here more
concerned in giving the reader a general idea of how these systems are constructed.
Now, with a basic understanding of modality and formal systems, I shall
proceed to discuss the topic at issue for this project. Deontic logic, as I said before, is
logic about norms. It is used specifically for ethical reasoning, but the systems
involved can easily apply to other normative models. A game with set rules might
make use of a primitive deontic logic, for example, and since we often treat legal and
civil duties similarly to moral ones, we will find that the same rules of reasoning
often apply. The standard approach to deontic logic is essentially deontic modality,
though it differs from other modal reasoning in several ways. The operators “£” and
“¯” are replaced by “O” and “P”, with “O” standing for obligation and “P” for
permission. This difference is mostly cosmetic, but it allows arguments in deontic
logic to make simultaneous use of alethic modality without undue confusion of
symbols.
What I mean by the phrase “deontic modality” needs a bit of explanation. If
modal logic is the logic of possibility and necessity, then deontic logic concerns
deontic possibility and necessity. Under the ordinary “possible worlds”
interpretation, this means that each permissible action generates a deontically
possible world. In each deontically possible world, every obligation can be fulfilled
jointly. This interpretation mirrors the way possible world semantics operates for
alethic modality. It runs into some problems when capturing ethical claims,
however. Possible worlds make sense when considering truth-valued statements
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capturing states of affairs. A universal state of affairs will give each intelligible
proposition a truth-value, and so instantiating modal operators in possible worlds is
a good decision method for modal logic. Ethical arguments often do not play by the
same rules, however. It may not always be the case, for example, that “OA & OB”
implies “O(A & B),” although the equivalent statement is certainly true in modal
systems. I will discuss this particular issue in the next chapter, as it is central to one
of the more powerful arguments against the consistency of dilemma-producing
theories.
Another substantive difference between modal and deontic logics becomes
apparent when one examines the “A” in “£A” or “OA.” In the case of alethic modality,
along with most temporal and belief logics, “A” represents some state of affairs, a
formula of propositional or quantificational logic. If this holds for deontic logic, as
well, the one should read “OA” as, “It is obligatory to bring it about that A.” This will
do fine for many moral thinkers, but a number of ethical theories make a point to
distinguish actions from their consequences. In these cases, it will be necessary to
use action-statements as subschemata for deontic claims. With this in mind, one
ought to read “OA” as, “It is obligatory to do A.” Georg Henrik von Wright, widely
accepted as the founder of contemporary deontic logic, makes use of actionstatements rather than states of affairs in his 1951 paper “Deontic Logic” (2). This
importantly alters how one constructs formulae of deontic logic. In alethic modality,
statements of the form “££A” or “¯£A” are perfectly admissible. “A holds
necessarily” is a proposition just as “A” is, so it can itself hold necessarily or
contingently. In von Wright’s deontic logic, however, nested operators like this will
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not be admitted. “It is obligatory to do A” is not an action-statement. As such, “OOA”
would not be well-formed.
It should be noted that in the formal language, we can allow “A” and “B” to
stand for specific instances of action, rather than general types of action. So “A”
could mean “Michael’s saving this particular child from drowning in this particular
pond at 10:15 am on June 2nd, 2018 in Toledo, Ohio.” This sort of paraphrase should
uniquely describe the particular action in question, so that formal sentences
represent instances of action. Compounds of action-statements can be formed as if
they were propositional: “A & ~B,” “A ⊃ (B v C),” and “(~A ≡ B) & (A v C)” are all
well-formed (von Wright, “Deontic Logic” 2-3). This does lead to some tricky
situations in interpreting certain statements of the logic, as I mentioned above with
“O(A & B).” The formal statement can be read back as normal (“It is obligatory to do
A and B jointly”), but it should be noted that doing A and B jointly denotes a
particular action, and that action may have a different deontic status than each of its
component parts (A and B).
I will follow these conventions for the time being, though I will not give a
thorough argument here for my preference for action-statements. Suffice it to say
that using action-statements does not fail to capture anything essential for
arguments about dilemmas, and so maintaining convention is at least
unproblematic. It will occasionally be necessary to include action-statements in
formulae of alethic modal logic, which becomes important in some arguments
against the existence of dilemmas in standard deontic systems. I will recall this use
of action-statements when I discuss those in greater detail, but it has minimal
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impact here, and it does not significantly affect the meaning of the alethic
statements.
Von Wright’s logic laid the groundwork for deontic logic in the late twentieth
century and on into the twenty-first. His original system was defined axiomatically.
He was writing before the popularity of possible-world semantics, which was
injected into deontic logic later. As such, rather than carefully defined systems of
possible worlds, the system is given in terms of fundamental laws, or axioms, which
serve as foundational formulae from which other statements, called theorems, are
derived. These are presented in Rod Girle’s text on modality in a more concise and
straightforward manner than in the original paper (I am altering the notation
slightly for the sake of consistency):
(C1): OA ≡ ~P~A
(C2): PA v P~A
(C3): P(A v B) ≡ (PA v PB)
(C4): “O(A v ~A)” and “~P(A & ~A)” are not valid.
(C5): If “A” and “B” are logically equivalent, then so are “PA” and “PB”
(Girle 171)
I will give a brief explanation of each axiom before discussing which modal
systems are the best fit for deontic logics. (C1) simply states the interdefinability of
the operators “O” and “P”. (C2) is like a law of excluded middle for morality: Either A
or its forbearance must be permissible. This is in keeping with intuition, and I will
not seriously challenge it here. It could be argued that (C2) and (C1) together beg
the question against a certain type of dilemma in which the same action is both
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forbidden and required. I am more interested in this project in contingent dilemmas,
where two different actions are each forbidden or each required, but an agent is
unable to execute both obligations, so I will set aside the worry.
(C3) distributes permission across disjunction, so that “You may do A or B”
is equivalent to “You may do A or you may do B.” It should be noted that (C3) is
equivalent to “O(~A & ~B) ≡ O~A & O~B” once one accepts (C1). This particular
formulation causes problems in some intuitive cases of moral reasoning. One
direction of the biconditional gives the agglomeration principle, which I will argue in
the next chapter is too strong a statement to be logically fundamental. For now, I
will say that it is at least plausible that (C3) holds, though I do not find it admissible
as a logical truth.
(C4) is somewhat strange to have as an axiom, since it does not actually give
a formula in the system that can be used to derive theorems. Rather, it states a true
fact about the logic, since neither of the stated formulae is derivable from the other
axioms. Specifying that the statements must not be valid serves mostly to
underscore that they are believed to be contingent, and ought to be discovered by
normative argument, rather than included as logically fundamental (von Wright,
“Deontic Logic” 10-11). Finally, (C5) simply says that equivalent actions have
equivalent deontic status. This causes no problems for the current project, and it
would seem quite strange to deny it.
I have given a very brief overview of the basics of deontic logic, focusing on
standard models. Before moving on, I will also discuss a few less widely-accepted
systems for representing norms. I will not use these much in the arguments to come,
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but they warrant consideration, since many feel that standard modal-adapted logic
does not adequately capture normative structure. One concern that is actually quite
relevant to the topic of this paper is the issue of conflicting obligations. Many moral
theories prescribe duties that conflict at least prior to analysis. I will argue of course
that certain conflicts of duties are absolute or undischargeable, but in many cases of
apparent conflict, one obligation takes precedence. Certain logicians attempt to
formalize these notions by introducing systems that assign obligations a preference
ordering.
Mark A. Brown has developed a system of moral preference ordering in his
deontic logic. He sets up his operators to indicate whether a state of affairs is
consistent with fulfilling obligations, quantifying over sets of obligations (Brown
121). He uses states of affairs as the contents of his deontic propositions, eschewing
von Wright’s action-statements. Brown establishes an urgency relation between
morally required states of affairs. Sets of possible worlds are assigned “degrees of
urgency,” defined fairly loosely to allow for various theoretical uses. State of affairs
B is at least as urgent as A if and only if every degree of urgency attaching to A
attaches to B as well (Brown 122-123). Without getting too deep into the
technicalities of the system, one can see that certain states of affairs are described as
normatively more important or preferable to others.
The motivations behind a system like Brown’s are fairly clear. We have the
intuition that some wrongdoings are worse than others. Under most theories, for
instance, it is better to lie to a person than to kill them. In either case, one will likely
be doing wrong, but it might be a matter of degree. Systems like Brown’s are
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attractive, though very technically complex. In any case, they fail to do away fully
with the problem of conflicting obligations. It may be easy to assign certain
obligations greater urgency than others (whether they are formulated as obligations
to take an action or to ensure a state of affairs), but many cases are murky. If two
obligations are similarly urgent, a method of representing difference in urgency will
be of little help. A system to formalize these claims is useful, but it does not
eliminate the conceptual difficulties that often arise when comparing moral
obligations. While these additions and changes may enrich a logical system’s
reasoning power, they do little to alleviate the problem of apparent inconsistency
for conflicting duties.
I will do well to mention something I passed over before, but which was
important in von Wright’s development of deontic logic: action logic. Unsatisfied
with indicating actions by single variables, von Wright developed a logic of action in
a book published a decade after “Deontic Logic” appeared. He saw it as essential that
a logic of norms also capture the logical structure of action. Since his early attempts,
many other theorists have attempted to schematize language about action, with
varying degrees of success. Deontic logician John Horty adapted branching-time
semantics from temporal modal logic to capture action. He had in mind the express
purpose of developing a richer deontic logic based on agency and decision-making.
Without going into further detail, I will remark that this project is extremely
important to the wider field of deontic logic, since so much of ethical theory revolves
around action. For the purposes of this project, however, I will stick to the simpler
syntax I have outlined previously. Systems like Brown’s and Horty’s will be relevant
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to the task of understanding moral dilemmas, but the reader will do fine with only a
passing familiarity.
In the next section, I will examine specific arguments that claim to disprove
the existence of moral dilemmas using certain standard axioms of deontic logic.
These arguments will be illuminating for understanding the logical properties of
dilemmas, as well as representing the most cogent reasons for rejecting them. I will
refute the arguments by challenging some of the axioms, which are taken for
granted in deontic systems. I am relying somewhat on the reader’s intuitive
understanding of the logical elements at play. The explanation I have given in this
chapter will, I hope, have familiarized the reader with the basics of the deontic
operators and their semantic interpretations. Alethic modality will play an
important role in the coming arguments, as well, though again a passing familiarity
will do for my present purposes. These logical systems are complex, but they serve
to make analysis of ethical arguments much clearer and more rigorous.

33

Chapter 3 - Agglomeration and Ought-Implies-Can

The preceding discussion of deontic logic’s formal basis will allow me to
present some formal arguments against moral dilemmas. The arguments here are
intended to show that if one accepts certain axioms of ethics, one is forced to
exclude genuine dilemmas from one’s moral theory. I will discuss two main
arguments, each of which uses a particular pair of premises seen as basic normative
or conceptual principles by many philosophers. I will give reasons for and against
each such principle, and in the end reject at least one of the principles needed in
each case. These arguments represent the most common and most compelling
reasons for taking moral dilemmas to be logically inconsistent. Each argument is
based on principles that are at least prima facie plausible, and which most thinkers
will be inclined to agree with at first glance. These axioms are often taken as
obviously true, with little need for defense. The problem with that approach is that
moral dilemmas also seem intuitively plausible in many cases, but one cannot accept
all these apparently basic principles and also admit dilemmas into one’s theory.
Since I come down on the side of dilemmas, I will reject some of the principles in
question.
The first argument I will examine is the more widely discussed of the two
(McConnell 5). It hinges on two potential axioms. Each of these formal axioms
represents an ethical (or metaethical) principle that is at least prima facie plausible.
The first of these is the “agglomeration principle,” which states that if one ought to
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do A and one ought to do B, then one ought to do A and B (Williams 118). In the
formal language, this is:
(AG): (OA & OB) ⊃ O(A & B)
The basic idea is fairly straightforward. Under the agglomeration principle, any pair
of individual obligations entails a joint obligation to perform all of the individual
actions in question. So if I am obligated to pay my taxes and obligated to refrain
from murder, then I am obligated to do both jointly. It is plain to see why this is
plausible, especially in cases where the individual obligations are unrelated, or at
least do not conflict. Some theorists, including Bernard Williams, have taken issue
with agglomeration as a general principle, however. One reason for rejecting it is
because of its role in dismissing genuine moral dilemmas (Williams 120). So if one
intuitively accepts moral dilemmas, one may be inclined to reject the principle.
The second axiom required for the argument is called the “ought implies can”
principle. What it means is that, if one is obligated to do A, one must be able to do A.
This principle seems fairly intuitive. At least, one would expect a reasonable normissuing authority to abide by it, and there are many cases where intuition would
strongly suggest that an agent is not obligated to do the impossible. For example,
most people would agree that an agent has an obligation to save a drowning child,
given that the agent will not seriously endanger herself by doing so. Consider a case
where a child is not drowning, but trapped under a car. The child will certainly die
very soon (soon enough that there is no chance of help arriving in time), but the
agent is alone and unable to lift the car. It seems fairly obvious that the agent has no
duty to take an impossible action, however regrettable it is that she cannot do so.

35
Formalizing this principle requires a somewhat more careful approach than
does the agglomeration principle. Taking “A” and “B” to be sufficiently specific (as I
mentioned in the previous chapter), a reasonable formalization for the principle
might be:
(OIC) OA ⊃ ¯A
This relies on a certain interpretation of the modal quantifiers, however. After all, it
is not at all logically impossible for Jane to lift the car in my example. This is a case of
physical or causal possibility. Of course one will maintain that Jane is not required to
lift the car. The advocate of the ought-implies-can principle will say that this case is
a legitimate application of the principle. It seems plausible that the principle
requires one to interpret “can” to indicate physical possibility. In that case, “OA ⊃
¯A” is a correct paraphrase only when the modal operators are taken to denote
physical (i.e. causal) necessity and possibility, as well. It may be possible to
construct a logic of ability to capture a more nuanced view of the “can” in oughtimplies-can, but I will not give one here. I will take the above as the correct
paraphrase, using a generalized version in the argument below. It will do well to
take note, however, that all appearances of modal operators will have to correspond
to the physical interpretation.
The argument dismissing dilemmas is by reductio ad absurdum. Formally, it
goes as follows:
(1)

OA

(Premise)

(2)

OB

(Premise)

(3)

~¯(A & B)

(Premise)
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(4)

(OA & OB) ⊃ O(A & B)

(AG)

(5)

(∀X)(OX ⊃ ¯X)

(OIC)

(6)

OA & OB

(From 1 and 2)

(7)

O(A & B)

(From 4 and 6)

(8)

O(A & B) ⊃ ¯(A & B)

(An instance of 5)

(9)

¯(A & B)

(From 7 and 8)

The premises give the definition of a moral dilemma. (1) and (2) state that
actions A and B are each individually obligatory. (3) paraphrases the claim that A
and B are mutually incompatible actions. Of course, “~¯(A & B)” should be taken to
indicate that A & B are contingently incompatible. This is not only because (OIC) is
taken to indicate physical or causal possibility (that is, possibility given the present
state of the world), but also because of the type of moral dilemma in question. I am
not interested in dilemmas where the two horns are logically incompatible. That
would be a situation where the very same action was both required and forbidden,
or where some two complex actions were mutually contradictory, but both were
required. “OA & O~A” and “O(A v (B & C)) & O(~A & ~B)” are two formal examples
of this type of dilemma. These dilemmas are more plainly inconsistent than a
dilemma where two actions are contingently incompatible, and indeed they are
denied by a pair of fairly indispensable axioms in the logic. Those axioms become
relevant for the second argument against contingent dilemmas, so I will leave a
fuller discussion of contradictory dilemmas until then. In any case, I am here
concerned with dilemmas of the form “OA & OB” where A and B are factually, rather
than logically, incompatible. So the paraphrase “~¯(A & B)”, with A and B
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sufficiently defined to each capture a specific instance of action must be construed
to mean that at time t, given the actual universal state of affairs, A and B cannot both
be performed by the given agent.
The argument as given above is fairly straightforward. By agglomeration, if A
and B are each obligatory, then their conjunction is obligatory, as well. The oughtimplies-can principle then requires that the agent is able to perform the complex
action A & B. However, since the premises describe a dilemma, the agent cannot, in
fact, do so. Thus, (3) and (9) stand in contradiction. The opponent of dilemmas will
then say that (1) or (2) must be wrong, that is that one or the other of the dilemma’s
horns is not in fact obligatory. How (and whether) one decides which of the two
courses is morally required is a matter that still warrants consideration. Any
situation that appears to be a dilemma will involve prima facie duties to do both A
and B. Thus, in order to deny genuine dilemmas, a theorist will need a way to
discern between mere prima facie duties and genuine obligations. Mark Brown’s
comparative obligation-logic provides a formal approach to just this problem, and
other logicians have constructed similar systems. Of course, most ethical theories
have some way of dismissing certain apparent obligations. Consequentialists use an
outcome-calculus and optimize within theory-specific guidelines, and deontologists
may say that some duties override or cancel out others.
As effective as the argument from agglomeration and ought-implies-can
seems, it has its opponents. I will here offer some responses that should lead the
reader to conclude that the argument can at least be plausibly denied. In that case,
its principles must not be foundational to a logic of imperatives, since a logical truth
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cannot be plausibly denied. Bernard Williams questions the obviousness of the
agglomeration principle in a 1965 symposium, which may suggest that one ought
not accept it as an axiom (120). That is to say, if agglomeration does hold, it will
follow from some more basic principles, and it should not be taken as self-evident or
logically trivial. I will follow his argument to some extent, but I will also consider a
principle of deontic modality that might guarantee the agglomeration of duties. This
principle is the wrong way to approach deontic logic, as I shall explain.
I will begin a prima facie counterexample to the agglomeration principle.
Consider Tom, who is in love with Catherine. He has promised to marry her,
although his parents would prefer he married Elisabeth. To appease his parents, he
promises them that he will do so. Assuming one admits promise-keeping as a moral
duty, one will say that Tom seems to be facing a dilemma. He ought to keep his
promise and marry Catherine, and he ought to keep his promise and marry
Elisabeth. However, it would be quite a stretch to say that Tom has a third duty to
keep both promises and marry both women. In fact, if one accepts that ought implies
can, one will likely have to reject such a duty, assuming Tom lives in a society where
polygamy is illegal. Even without appeal to ought-implies-can, one will likely
maintain that keeping both promises would in fact be morally wrong, since both
women accepted promises of marriage under the implicit assumption of monogamy.
It would violate the spirit of both promises if both were kept, so however one
approaches the issue, Tom appears to be in a double bind.
Assuming that Tom cannot (or should not) marry both women, the supporter
of agglomeration may have a few replies to the example. First, one could say, “Tom

39
is required to do something he cannot.” Supposing for argument’s sake that oughtimplies-can holds, one cannot take this tack. If one has a moral objection to
marrying two women, then Tom cannot be obligated to do so if he is obligated not to
do the very same. Then perhaps one says, “Tom is not required to marry both
women, there exist only two separate duties to keep each individual promise.”
Obviously, to say this would be to abandon agglomeration. In the end, if one wants
to hold onto both principles, one must say, “One of Tom’s promises (at least) was
made in bad faith, so he has no genuine duty to keep it.” This response avoids the
apparent difficulty, but it raises some concerns of its own. This line suggests that if
one makes a promise one knows is in conflict with another duty, one is not bound by
the promise. We might say merely that it is wrong to make such a promise because
to do so is deceptive. Once made, the promise holds no weight.
The posited view seems to let the dishonest promise-maker of the proverbial
hook for their wrongdoings. Surely individuals are responsible to keep their
promises, even and especially when they have promised deceitfully. Suppose that
rather than being engaged to Catherine, Tom simply doesn’t like Elisabeth and
enjoys the single life. He still promises to his parents that he will marry Elisabeth,
though he never intends to keep the promise. Obviously he is bound by it, although
he made the promise in full knowledge that he would not keep it. The difference
between the cases lies in the fact that when he is engaged to Catherine, Tom has a
good reason not to keep his promise. By promising to marry Elisabeth, he promises
something that is impossible, assuming he fulfills all of his other obligations.
Certainly making this promise is wrong, but to say that it does not generate an
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obligation is to misunderstand the situation. Violation of a promise is a wrong act
because it is a wrong against an individual. In this case, Tom is beholden to his
parents and Elisabeth. He has a duty to these people to fulfill his promise. By
violating the promise, he is using them instrumentally and violating their trust. It
should be fairly uncontroversial to say one ought not to violate others’ trust, and
Tom’s promise is an instance of this obligation.
The reader may respond: “But of course there are situations where it is
permissible to violate another’s trust! What if the only way to rescue a bus full of
innocent children from a painful death was to break a promise?” This response
appeals to quite a correct common sense notion. It may seem that in Tom’s case, his
promise is similarly overridden. It should first be noted that in the bus-full-ofchildren case, it hardly seems like a logical truth of imperative logic that one duty
should take precedence. However, any plausible moral theory will involve a
permission to break a promise if doing so saves a bus full of children. In any case, a
better response is to point out that the force of the objection comes from the
urgency and relative significance of the overriding duty. One obviously feels very
strongly that one must prevent the needless and painful deaths of innocent children,
especially when one loses little or nothing by saving them.
Tom’s case is quite different from the bus-full-of-children example. It is
important in Tom’s case that his obligations are of equal force. In both cases, he
promised to marry someone. The duties are extremely similar. One might point to
the difference in the who Tom promised (one promise was to Catherine, the other to
Tom’s parents), but the example could easily be altered to eliminate any cosmetic
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difference between the two promises. The point is that an appeal to the relative
force of one duty will not avail the defender of agglomeration. The only remaining
objection will be to claim that whichever promise was made in bad faith does not
count. This will likely be whichever is made later, although one could appeal to
Tom’s attitude toward the promise rather than the time in which he makes it.
I stated before that one might balk at letting deceitful promisors off the hook
of keeping their promises. This is not to say that every reasonable moral theory will
bind a person to every promise they make. The case of the bus full of children shows
that it is possible under nearly every theory for one to be released from a promise,
even one made legitimately. A more urgent obligation may require one to break a
promise, in which case doing so is likely permissible. Likewise, if one is coerced into
promising, one is not morally bound to keep the promise. As such, some theories
will certainly dismiss at least one of Tom’s obligations. The important thing is that at
least one plausible theory will not discharge one or the other of Tom’s promises.
Any theory under which Tom is obligated to keep each promise individually but not
to marry both women will reject the agglomeration principle. If such a theory is
plausible, then agglomeration fails to hold as a conceptual truth for norms in
general. Since that is exactly what a deontic axiom is, a plausible non-agglomerative
moral theory is evidence that one ought not to admit agglomeration as an axiom.
Of one could reasonably believe a moral theory under which Tom is obligated
to marry each of two women, but not both, one must reject agglomeration as an
axiom. Discovering this will likely be somewhat surprising, since agglomeration
appears to be such an obvious truth. Indeed, the reader may recall that one of von
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Wright’s axioms of deontic logic implies agglomeration. In fact, agglomeration
follows from a particular sort popular model for deontic logic. Deontic modality (the
view that deontic logic is really capturing a notion of normative possibility) seems to
imply agglomeration. I will argue that a modal system begs the question of
agglomeration and explain why one need not admit agglomeration on logical
grounds.
In a standard deontic logic, permissions generate possible worlds, and every
obligation is fulfillable in every possible world (Girle 170). This upholds the
common analogy with modal logic. In a modal system possibility generates worlds
and necessity populates them. Two contradictory states of affairs cannot both hold
necessarily. If deontic logic mirrors modal logic then obligation mirrors necessity, so
all obligatory actions must be jointly fulfillable. Deontic modality is an attractive
model for a semantics of deontic logic. Deontic logic was developed in parallel with
modal logic, and many systems explicitly use the basic rules and deductive methods
for modal logic. In these systems, the analogy to alethic modality hides certain
assumptions.
The reader has likely noticed the issue with this system and the
agglomeration principle. A deontically possible world is exactly a world in which
every obligation is fulfilled in conjunction. That is to say, if one made an exhaustive
list of every action required by some source of normative force, those actions would
populate a world bound by the normal rules of logic, in particular the law of noncontradiction. If this is the model for a logic of norms then of course OA and OB
together imply O(A & B). To say “OA & OB” is just to say, “In every deontically
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possible world, A and B are both performed.” “O(A & B)” says just the same thing:
Then agglomeration is in fact a biconditional. That biconditional is axiom (C3) of von
Wright’s original system for deontic logic. I need not discuss the second direction of
the biconditional here. It is fairly trivial to break “O(A & B)” down into its two
components, but that approach does nothing for the argument against dilemmas.
The approach of adapting modal semantics to deontic logic begs the question
of agglomeration. The world-populating rule does not simply imply agglomeration;
the statements are identical. Then my earlier argument against agglomeration
should have the same implication for deontic modality. Deontic logic is meant first
and foremost to model the logical properties and relations of imperative statements.
If cases involving incompatible obligations are logically possible, then any principle
banning such cases is not a logical but rather a theoretic principle. Certainly many, if
not most theories will demand agglomeration of duties, but at least one plausible
theory will not. Any logically impossible set of principles will be implausible, so it
follows that plausibility is a sufficient metric by which to reject agglomeration as an
axiom.
The flaws in adapting alethic modal semantics for deontic logic will become
even clearer when the reader considers what a logic of prima facie obligation might
look like. One could presumably develop a system to represent and argue about
those obligations that arise out of loose or unrestricted application of a moral rule.
The only real objection to developing such a logic would be that moral intuitions are
often confusing and may not necessarily match onto one another. This is not a real problem
for the project of designing such a logic, only for its ability to fully capture ordinary

44
language. “Prima facie obligations” could be taken to mean “obligations obtained from initial
application of an ethical principle.” Thus, Kant’s apparent prohibition against lying might
collapse when brought up against a stronger-grounded rule. Nonetheless, applying a moral
principle is a consistent, reliable process, even if it is done without a fuller analysis of the
options available to the agent, so developing a logic of prima facie duties should be possible

Prima facie dilemmas are present in nearly every moral system. If a prima
facie obligation-logic is possible then most ethical theories will allow statements in
that logic of the form “OA & OB & ~¯(A & B).” It is not unreasonable to suppose that
such a logic could maintain the ought-implies-can principle, in which case it would
have to do away with agglomeration in order to account for these situations. Prima
facie obligations are still imperative in form, so they will follow all the rules of a
logic of norms. In other words, since the axioms of deontic logic are not specific to
ethical imperatives, prima facie norms fit the bill. In this way, one sees that there is
at least one possible use of deontic logic that does away with agglomeration. Again,
one is enough. If the principle does not hold for all possible systems of normative
statements and arguments, then it is not an axiom. Since deontic modality would
suggest otherwise, one should reject that model as insufficient to represent
normative reasoning in at least some cases.
I will now briefly consider reasons for and against the ought-implies-can
principle. It has its opponents, though the majority of thinkers are inclined to accept
that ought implies can. There are quite a number of good reasons to do so. I will
consider what I take to be one of the more powerful objections to the theory, but
ultimately dismiss it. If one has followed me thus far with agglomeration, one will
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recognize that I need not in fact reject ought-implies-can. In the end, denying the
principle does indeed seem to defy the basic logic of imperatives. As such, the
weight of the argument falls on the agglomeration of duties, which is only basic to a
logical system that take seriously talk of deontically possible worlds.
The intuition toward the ought-implies-can principle comes largely from
cases like that of Jane’s inability to save a child trapped under a car. In these
situations, an action which might be obligatory is not actually so because of physical
limitations on the agent’s actions. The limitation exists independently of Jane’s
desire to save the child. Some other cases complicate the intuition, however.
Consider the case of Duke, a man who, due mostly to his upbringing, is inclined
toward intentional racism (example adapted from Talbot 3). That is to say, he is
psychologically incapable of refraining from certain racist actions, though he is
aware that his actions are racist, and endorses them (it is assumed that these racist
actions are morally wrong). Thus, at time t, given the actual state of the world, it is
not (physically or causally) possible for Duke not to shout a racial slur at a passerby,
say. According to ought-implies-can, this means that Duke is not obligated to refrain
from his racist actions.
In Duke’s case, one would insist that certain moral results follow from his
actions, prior to determining whether an obligation exists. Duke likely owes an
apology to the direct victims of his racism. He has good reason to provide
reparations to those against whom he has discriminated. He and others should try
to prevent or mitigate his actions, and others should avoid complicity in his actions.
In brief, Duke has done something wrong. Talbot posits these factors from intuition,
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and claims that the best explanation for this moral residue is genuine wrongdoing.
This approach is somewhat suspect for a few reasons, some of which the reader has
likely picked up on already. Nonetheless, I find Talbot’s tack indicates the best line
of argument against the principle. I will discuss Talbot’s argument before presenting
what I believe are insurmountably powerful objections.
What the argument boils down to is this: Ought-implies-can is best justified
by appeal to the action-guiding power of norms. It relies on a narrow reading of
action guidance, however. Under a more robust sense of guidance, wrongdoing in
cases where the agent could not have done otherwise actually provides a better
explanation for certain reciprocal, compensatory, and preventative actions. In
Duke’s case, dismissing the principle seems plausible. In that situation, most people
will maintain that a racist actor has done wrong, even if their wrongdoing is the
result of societal factors beyond their control. The action has moral effects identical
or at least extremely similar to those resulting from violating an obligation. It seems
reasonable, then, to say that although Duke could not have acted otherwise, he is
nonetheless guilty of a moral violation. He ought not to perform racist acts, but he
does, and he does so intentionally.
Talbot points to Duke’s obligations to apologize for his racist behavior and
mitigate it where possible, taking these as evidence of residue similar to that of a
violated obligation (3). According to Talbot, an obligation to do A at time t (perhaps
with greater detail specifying place, agent, et cetera) can guide action in a number of
ways. Obviously, it guide’s the agent to perform action A at that time. It may guide
the agent’s actions beforehand as she makes plans for the future. It may guide an
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agent to compensate or “approximate the obligatory act” when she fails in an
obligation (Talbot 2). It may also guide others to act in order to prevent the agent’s
violating her duty, or else to reprimand or demand apology when she does. In short,
there are a number of ways an obligation may influence behavior, both in the
obligated agent and those around her.
In Duke’s case, if he has an obligation not to make racist remarks despite his
compulsion, one can explain how he comes to be obligated to apologize and make
amends. Likewise, one might believe he has an obligation to avoid those situations
in which he is most inclined to act badly. Both of these secondary actions are part of
the obligation’s “robust action guidance” (Talbot 2). Even though it cannot guide
Duke not to make racist remarks, since that is beyond his control, his obligation not
to do so is intelligible, according to Talbot. He goes on to argue for his position by
attempting to categorize how theories will explain the phenomenon of robust action
guidance. I will give a brief overview of his discussion on the subject, and then focus
on several points where I found Talbot’s example and arguments suspicious.
Talbot argues that theories that reject ought-implies-can lack explanatory
power in cases like Duke’s. They must give a separate account of moral residue in
cases where ought-implies-can applies. They can do this in one of two ways.
Disjunctive theories will claim that certain principles beyond obligation provide
robust action guidance when an agent is not in control of her actions. If these same
principles apply in cases where an agent is in control, then the theory faces the
trouble of overdetermining the moral impacts of actions (Talbot 3.1). When the only
difference between two situations is the degree of control an agent has, disjunctive
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theories double up on explaining the case of genuine agency, or else open
themselves up to disunity by offering two entirely different explanations in very
similar cases (Talbot 3.2).
It is not clear to me that Talbot’s “doubling up problem” (3.1) is really as
much of a problem as he believes. He claims that if two reasons are given for the
robust action guidance in cases of agent control then the guidance will be stronger
proportionally to the strength of the extra principles (those used to provide robust
guidance in non-control situations). This does not follow. It need not be the case that
richer explanation for a normative force implies greater power. If the only
difference in cases is that in one, the agent has control and in the other she does not
then likely there will be no difference in the strength of the robust action guidance.
New obligations generated in each case will be the result of whatever principles
apply, and the degree of control (and presence of an obligation) will likely alter only
one’s attitude toward the perpetrator. This is perfectly natural. We do not blame
people for what they cannot help.
Talbot offers another solution, replacing disjunctive theories with “elegant”
ones (3.3). These theories never appeal to obligations to explain robust action
guidance. Rather, they incorporate some other principles, which apply regardless of
how much control an agent has over her actions. Talbot identifies certain problems
facing elegant theories. Even in situations where it is natural to appeal to obligation
(for example, in an apology), one cannot do so on an elegant theory. It is not clear
why that is the case. It seems an elegant theory could rely on secondary principles to
explain those residues that are relevant when ought-implies-can applies, but allow
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obligation to do the work for situations where a certain type of residue only occurs
when an agent is in control of her actions. At any rate, it seems that Talbot is not
quite explicit enough in just how disjunctive and elegant theories fail to account for
robust action guidance. It seems a small bullet to bite in whichever direction one
wishes to go.
I believe the strength of Talbot’s argument lies largely in his example
involving Duke. The problem is that the example is not quite honest. Talbot tries to
ride the line between positing a genuinely compulsive or involuntary actor and
presenting a character whose actions are condemnable. In choosing a man whose
wrong actions are racist, he plays into the reader’s natural reaction to distance
himself from racism. I imagine that if Duke were seizing violently and physically
injuring those around him rather than shouting racial slurs, we would be disinclined
to demand apologies or reparations. The defining factor is Duke’s endorsement of
his own racist actions. This indicates not an obligation to refrain from those actions
(when he cannot help it), but a corruption of moral character that the reader finds
off-putting at best. The example obscures the intent in this case, and in most other
examples of involuntary harms I think we would be less quick to grant Talbot his
leaps.
One aspect of the ought-implies-can principle may raise some eyebrows: It
would seem that, when one gets oneself into an impossible situation, one might be
obligated to do the impossible. This could only apply in cases where one rendered
oneself incapable of honoring an obligation. Talbot mentions such an example
briefly (2). The notion that one might be required to do something one ought to be
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able to do seems powerful, but an alternate explanation is available. If this is a case
of robust action guidance, one should be guided not to perform whatever actions
gets one in the pickle to begin with. Carrie, who schedules a flight when she has
promised to pick up her friend, is responsible for her own failure to keep her
promise. The defender of ought-implies-can might simply say that one has an
obligation not to cause oneself to do wrong later. Carrie may not be obligated to pick
up Mindy once she is on the plane, since that obligation would be pointless. Rather,
she is obligated not to buy the ticket for that particular time, since it will violate
Mindy’s trust.
In the end, I believe Talbot’s endeavor fails. He attempts to dismiss alternate
explanations for robust action guidance, but neither counterargument is particularly
strong. His reply to the overguidance objection is somewhat stronger, but he
succeeds only in saying that his theory is not the only one with those problems (4).
All the standard reasons for accepting ought-implies-can seem to survive the debate.
It does indeed mean that obligations at least will provide a certain important sort of
narrow action guidance. One may still be puzzled as to why one has no obligation to
fly around the world rescuing a child per minute if one can be required to do the
impossible. In short, ought-implies-can stands up to scrutiny.
While I have defended the ought-implies-can principle, its role in the argument
against dilemmas is moot. We have excellent reasons not to accept agglomeration as
a logical truth, and so it is inadmissible as an axiom. In that case, while oughtimplies-can seems to be a basic fact about normative logic, dilemma-producing
moral theories remain intact, at least up to the point of formal consistency. The next
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argument draws on different axioms, again attempting to show that genuine
dilemmas imply a theory’s inconsistency. That argument will ultimately fail, as well.
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Chapter 4 - Deontic Consistency and Entailment

The argument from agglomeration and ought-implies-can is by far the most
popular argument for accusing moral dilemmas of inconsistency (McConnell 4). The
appeal likely comes from the axioms’ intuitive attractiveness, taken together with its
treatment by several widely-read contemporary ethicists (Sinnott-Armstrong 137;
Williams 118). The principles of agglomeration and ought-implies can are relatively
simple to represent in ordinary language. This makes arguing about them mostly a
matter of intuition and reasoning, rather than interpretation of obscure logical
forms. I think this last contributes most heavily to the rareness of the second formal
argument against dilemmas.
The argument I will present here comes from two principle of deontic logic
that live closer to the formal heart of deontic systems. One follows quickly from
basic definitions of the operators, and the other attempts to account for logical
entailment and incorporate modal necessity. The first principle, sometimes called
the “principle of deontic consistency” goes formally as follows:
(PDC) ~(OA & O~A)
In ordinary English, this means that the very same act cannot be both required and
forbidden. The defender of dilemmas’ consistency will quickly object that this
principle begs the question against a certain type of moral dilemma, and so it is
inadmissible without proof. The problem for the proponent of “A & ~A” dilemmas is
that proof of the axiom is not hard to find. Recall that the operators “P” and “O” are
defined thus:
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(C1) OA ≡ ~P~A
Another axiom of the system is this:
(C2) PA v P~A
(C1) says simply, “An action A is obligatory iff it is impermissible to refrain from A.”
This is a natural interpretation of obligation, and it would defy intuition at the very
least to deny it. (C2) says that for every action A, either A or its forbearance must be
permissible.
Taken together, (C1) and (C2) clearly imply (PDC). Whichever of “PA” or
“P~A” holds will determine that either “~O~A” or “~OA” holds. (C1) seems to be the
only interdefinition of the operators that captures ordinary use. Permission is
exactly non-forbiddance, or at least non-forbiddance after due consideration by
whatever normative authority is permitting and forbidding. In the case of ethics,
every action is subject to consideration, so questions of the scope of the normauthority do not apply. Any refutation of (C1) would have to claim either: (i) ~OA &
~P~A, or (ii) P~A & OA were possible. (i) would mean that there are cases in which
A is not obligatory, but it is not permissible to refrain from A. (ii) would mean there
are cases in which A is required, but an agent may refrain from A. It should be clear
that, assuming morality issues some judgment on every action (i.e. moral principles
can be applied in any case), every action must have some deontic status, and of
course no action can be required and its forbearance permitted. (C2) follows quickly
from this, since a moral norm-authority is universal in scope. There is no board that
needs to review its pronouncements. Every action or its negation is permitted, since
obligation implies permission.

54
(PDC) follows from (C1) and (C2), both of which are quite necessary to make
much sense of deontic logic at all. The second principle required for the argument
against dilemmas is what I will call “the principle of deontic entailment.” Formally,
the statement is:
(PDE) £(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (OA ⊃ OB)
What (PDE) says seems simple enough at first glance. If A necessarily implies
(entails) B, then A is obligatory only if B is obligatory. In other words, A’s moral
requirement entails B’s moral requirement when A entails B. An illustrative example
will be helpful here. Suppose I make a promise to visit a friend at a certain time. I am
clearly required to keep this promise. Keeping a promise is a straightforward
obligation that one has in nearly every situation in which one makes a promise.
Keeping this particular promise entails my visiting my friend at the appointed time.
Of course I am obligated to do so, since otherwise I will break my promise. My
promise was just to take this action B, so B’s forbearance clearly violates an
imperative. The obligation to keep a promise is logically distinct from the obligation
to take any particular promise-fulfilling action, but the one follows directly from the
other.
This is an example of logical entailment of actions implying entailment of
obligations. The reader will recall from the previous chapter that I there interpreted
“¯” as indicating physical or causal possibility. The distinction between physical
and logical necessity now becomes quite important. I will leave a full analysis and
counterargument against (PDE) until after I have given the argument against
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dilemmas, but I will say for now that the principle comes up against significant
difficulties when one is more careful with the modal operator.
The second argument claiming dilemmas’ inconsistency goes thus, assuming
S5 (whereby all possible worlds are freely accessible) as the modal system:
(3)

OA

(Premise)

(4)

OB

(Premise)

(3)

~¯(A & B)

(Premise)

(4)

£~(A & B)

(From 3 by interdefinition of ¯ & £)

(5)

£(A ⊃ ~B)

(From 4 by truth-functional replacement)

(6)

£(A ⊃ ~B) ⊃ (OA ⊃ O~B) (PDE)

(7)

O~B

(From 1, 5, and 6)

(8) ~(OB & O~B)

(PDC)

(9) OB & O~B

(From 2 and 7)

Again, the premises of the argument simply describe a moral dilemma. The
truth-functional replacement in (5) will require multiple steps in most rigorous
proof systems, but any plausible modal system will preserve necessity across truthfunctionally equivalent statements. The use of “¯” to indicate causal possibility in
(3) is important. As I mentioned when discussing ability in the previous chapter, this
interpretation of the modal operators is useful for capturing notions like an agent’s
ability, and for discussing what lies in the realm of physical possibility. The problem
arises in (6), when the argument makes use of the same modal system to express
the principle of deontic entailment. This use assumes (PDE) is meant to apply to
instances of causal necessity, wherein one’s taking A determines, due to facts about
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the world, that one takes action B. The other possible interpretation of (PDE) is that
it applies to cases of logical entailment. The contradiction between (8) and (9) is
clear, and all the inferences are straightforward. It seems again that the best
criticisms of this argument will target the axioms.
Above, I offered brief explanations of the axioms, and I defended (PDC)
somewhat. The fact that the principle of deontic consistency follows
straightforwardly from more fundamental principles at least provides a strong
reason to accept it. I will focus my remarks here on (PDE). The principle of deontic
entailment is certainly a valuable addition to any system of formalizing ethics.
Whenever one obligation gives rise to a related one, chances are good that it does so
because of entailment. In my earlier example, I discussed promises. The obligation
to keep a promise obviously entails a subsequent obligation to take whatever course
of action was promised. An intuitive explanation for that relationship would be that
whenever one action entails another, the second is obligatory if the first is. In this
case, keeping the promise to visit my friend entails visiting my friend. (PDE) offers a
reason for the one duty to give rise to the other.
I will turn shortly to a potential causal account of (PDE). The distinction
between logical and causal necessity and possibility may need some further
illumination first, though. Both of these concepts fall under the umbrella of alethic
modality. As I discussed in my introduction to deontic and modal logic, alethic
modality is modality about how states of affairs (or in the present case, actions) may
occur possibly or necessarily, or how some states of affairs may necessarily lead to
or entail other states of affairs. These (i.e. logical and causal) types of modality
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diverge in more than way. On the one hand, an action (or state of affairs) may
logically entail another based on how it’s phrased. If “A” stands for “the agent in
question bandages the man (Robert) who will be robbed by Benjamin” (example
from Castañeda 14), then A entails B by first-order logic, where “B” stands for
“Benjamin robs Robert.” One of course would not say that A caused B to happen in
any serious sense. This particular case illuminates a problem with considering
(PDE) as addressing logical entailment, which I will discuss later.
Logical modality concerns statements either of actions or states of affairs
that have modal status due to their construction. All sentences of the form “p v ~p,”
for example, are logically necessary. Causal modality can be taken as identical to
physical (or perhaps factual) modality. It will typically incorporate some temporal
consideration. The principle is that a state of affairs (or action) A is necessary if,
given the actual state of the universe at some point in time t, A obtains in every
possible subsequent universal state of affairs. Logical modality is universal: A
logically valid statement holds in every possible world. Logical truths are factindependent, so no state of affairs will preclude a given logical necessity.
How does this apply to Robert and Benjamin? Obviously it is not logically
necessary that Benjamin rob Robert. Rather, the conditional “If I bandage the man
whom Benjamin will rob, and that man is Robert, then Benjamin will rob Robert.” It
is entirely plausible that Benjamin does not rob Robert, in which case the
antecedent of this conditional comes out false, since I did not bandage the man
Benjamin robbed. I bandaged Robert. In the case of causal worlds, access is
temporally ordered. Universal states of affairs hold at different times, and each
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instant accesses future states, i.e. possible worlds. So modally-considered
statements always apply to future worlds. The question remains of how to interpret
the principle of deontic entailment when its formal statement, “£(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (OA ⊃
OB),” is ambiguous.
Consider the following situation: I promise to drive a friend to the bank.
Unbeknownst to me, my friend intends to rob the bank. I have no reason to believe
this. At least up to my knowledge, I have an obligation to drive my friend to the
bank. Suppose that, if I do not drive him, he will not rob the bank. Then it is clear
that my driving him causally guarantees that he robs the bank. Assuming I have an
obligation to keep my promises (at least when I have no reason to believe doing so
will bring about ill effect), I am obligated to drive my friend to the bank. My doing so
causes me to take a second action, though not intentionally: I assist my friend in
robbing a bank. Clearly, I do not have an obligation to enable my friend’s robbery. I
likely have an obligation to attempt to prevent it. Here, “A” stands for “I drive my
friend to the bank” and “B” for “I enable my friend’s robbing the bank.” Clearly, the
antecedent “£(A ⊃ B)” holds, since my driving guarantees the robbery takes place.
Since I have an obligation to take action A, (PDE) would give the result that I have a
duty to help my friend rob the bank. Since that is obviously not the case, one has
reason to scrutinize the situation, or else to reject (PDE) for cases of causal
entailment.
One particular point of this example sticks out. When I claim that I have an
obligation to fulfill my promise, this is presumably because I am unaware of the
unfortunate consequences of the action (under some theories, my obligation will
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withstand the exposure of my friend’s larcenous intentions, but it is at least
plausible that full knowledge of the relevant facts will eliminate my duty). What
deontic facts will change if I know my friend’s intentions? Presumably, I will no
longer have an obligation to drive him. My promise-keeping obligation may be
overridden by a separate obligation to prevent a robbery, at least given that
preventing the robbery involves negligible effort on my part. The question for (PDE)
is whether my not having an obligation to aid in a robbery is sufficient justification
for the claim that I cannot have an obligation to drive my friend to the bank. If this
were the case, though, I presumably would not have had the obligation to drive my
friend in the original case, according to (PDE).
Perhaps I can only have obligations in cases where my knowledge of the
relevant facts is complete. That position seems reasonable, but it has problematic
implications. Under such a view, agents will face numerous situations in which they
become morally responsible for the unforeseeable results of their actions. If a theory
of morality is properly action-guiding, it cannot demand agents act on knowledge
they do not possess. This would be something like rejecting ought-implies-can. An
obligation to take some action without having a reason is similar to a duty to do the
impossible. The obligation is inert. Assuming an actor’s ignorance is not willful, one
would not consider action taken without full knowledge as blameworthy or
warranting rebuke. I think most people have a strong intuition that agents are
responsible for foreseeable results but not the unforeseeable results of their actions,
but I will offer a clarificatory example.
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Suppose Michael is walking along beside a pond when he sees a child
struggling in the water. It is clear that if he does not help the child, she will drown. It
will be no great burden on him to rescue the child; Michael is a strong swimmer and
can easily pull her to shore. Any theory that admits positive obligations (obligations
to take, rather than only forbear actions) will require that Michael save the girl.
Unbeknownst to Michael, just around the next bend in the road is another pond with
five young children drowning. If Michael were aware of these children’s plight, he
could save them. If he saves the girl in the first pond, he will be too late to rescue the
others. The intuition is clear in the first case that Michael must rescue the girl. Were
he aware of the other children’s situation, he would certainly have an obligation to
rescue them. Whenever he has an obligation to rescue the others, it is at least
plausible that he has an obligation to rescue the others instead of the girl.
Plausibility is enough here: If (PDE) is a fundamental axiom of normative
considerations, then any reasonable moral theory will be subject to it. There are
reasonable moral theories under which saving five lives is preferable to saving one.
Suppose Michael has an obligation to rescue the five children in spite of his
ignorance. Obviously, he cannot do so without continuing past the drowning girl in
the pond. In that case, Michael is not only permitted, but actually obligated to walk
past the child drowning in the pond, although he has no reason to believe his actions
will lead to his rescuing more children. This is plainly an unacceptable conclusion.
In the above case, it is clear that morality requires Michael to take those
actions that he is obligated to take up to his knowledge. To return to the bank
robbery example, it is now clear that my original obligation to keep my promise was
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genuine. The unforeseeable consequences of my action do not have deontic status
(assuming my ignorance, like Michael’s, is not due to an unreasonable interpretation
of those facts available to me). In that case, the supporter of a causally-interpreted
(PDE) may simply claim that the modal operator in the principle’s formal statement
must be taken to apply only up to reasonable knowledge of the situation. This
objection seems palatable, but it fails in the end. Suppose Kim is driving down the
road. She sees a child in the road and swerves to avoid hitting him. She is aware that
in so doing, she will hit a mailbox. She can see the mailbox before she swerves, but of
course would prefer destroying property to killing or injuring the child. She clearly
has an obligation not to hit the child.
Is it right to say Kim is obligated to hit a person’s mailbox? Kim’s swerving is
purely instrumental to fulfilling her obligation. When she swerves, she is doing so
only in order to avoid hitting the child. Her real obligation is not to take some
physical action, but to avoid causing a child’s death. It is reasonable to say that
instrumental actions are morally required when they are necessary antecedents to
fulfilling primary obligations. In fact, very few primary obligations deal with firstorder acts like turning a steering wheel within a certain time frame. Instrumental
obligations are secondary, but genuine moral duties. Kim’s hitting the mailbox is not
instrumental to her not striking the child, however. According to the logical model
for temporal ordering and causal modality, later actions cannot causally determine
previous ones. Nor should they be able to. To say so would be to assault common
sense. Thus, there is no sense in which Kim’s hitting the mailbox, which takes place
after her obligation not to hit the child is fulfilled, is causally responsible for the
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child’s safety. Rather, the two share a common cause. Kim’s instrumental action of
swerving her car just so (an action which is itself obligatory) causally determines
both that she fulfills her duty to avoid the child and that she hit the mailbox.
The question that remains is whether secondary duties to perform certain
instrumental actions can generate further duties to take causally determined actions
(specifically those later in time). It is clear that instrumental duties have some
powers of conferral. Kim’s obligation to move her hands and feet in a certain way is
inherited from her obligation to swerve her car. This inheritance occurs
retroactively. That is to say, if an action A is obligatory and an action B is causally
required to execute A, then B is obligatory. There seems to be no reason to suppose
that the same principle would hold of those actions that come about as unintended
(but predictable) results of obligatory actions. Presumably, the child in Kim’s case
will be distraught by the ordeal. If he cries, one would not say that Kim was
obligated to see to it that he does so. Rather, this is a result preferable to his death,
but by no means morally required.
Kim’s example illustrates that obligation can be causally inherited, but only
when the inheriting action is causally required to execute the content of the primary
obligation. Assuming one accepts causal determination at least at the macroscopic
physical level, one must acknowledge that our actions have vastly far-reaching and
intricate causal results. To claim that morality prescribes all such results of any
obligatory action is to needlessly overpopulate one’s ethical ontology. If there is no
good reason to believe that actions confer their deontic status forward in time, and
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if denying the same does not invalidate any strongly held moral intuitions, one
ought to reject the principle.
What becomes of (PDE) on this view? A more discursive semantics for the
particular brand of causal modality in question may allow a useful formalization of
the principle, but strict temporally ordered causation will not suffice. On the other
hand, the present formation of (PDE) may hold when the modal operators are
interpreted differently. As I mentioned before, the relationship of promises to their
contents is neatly captured by the principle, so it clearly has some value as a
foundational concept in ethics. This use does give rise to an important worry about
how one ought to formulate actions when using the principle this way. Earlier, I
invoked Hector Castañeda’s example with Benjamin and Robert. With this case in
mind, the reader will likely have a good idea of where the problem arises. If one
phrases one’s description as, “Arthur bandages the man (Robert) whom Benjamin
will Rob,” then Benjamin’s robbing Robert is entailed, and obligatory when Arthur’s
ministrations are obligatory. I will echo Castañeda’s solution to the quandary, and
conclude with a brief description of how moral dilemmas hold up given the rejection
of (PDE)’s original interpretation.
In his discussion, Canstañeda defines what he calls “acts prescriptively
considered” as acts which can be accurately mirrored in the imperative mood or
“mandate” form (19-21). In so doing, he details a number of tests whereby linguistic
mirroring of statements into the imperative mood illuminates whether the meaning
of certain clauses is captured prescriptively or merely describes context. I will not
give a full description of each of his tests, but I think an example will clarify his

64
rather complex approach. Returning to the Benjamin and Robert example, the test
goes thus: The statement “Arthur bandages the man (Robert) who will be robbed by
Benjamin” entails “Benjamin will rob Robert.” To examine their deontic relationship,
however, we must consider each statement as a mandate. The imperative “Arthur,
bandage the man (Robert) who will be robbed by Benjamin” does not entail
“Benjamin, rob Robert” (Castañeda 21). Our analysis shows that in the case of
language considered descriptively, logical entailment holds, and (PDE) would seem
to apply if it ever does for logical entailment. Benjamin’s robbing Robert is not an act
prescriptively considered, however. The mandate tests reveal this caveat, allowing
us to adhere to the intuitive maxim that descriptions of context must not lead us to
paradoxes of ethics.
With the primary worry for (PDE)’s application to logical conditionals out of
the way, all that remains is to consider what remains of the principle’s value for a
system of deontic logic. Consider the case of promises. Obviously, any correct formal
paraphrase of “I fulfill my promise to visit my friend on Thursday” will entail “I visit
my friend on Thursday.” When we apply Castañeda’s test, we discover that the
mandate, “Samuel, fulfill your promise to visit your friend on Thursday” implies the
mandate, “Samuel, visit your friend on Thursday.” Thus, the original motivation for
the principle of deontic entailment is still satisfied. One can meaningfully claim that
holding to commitments implies executing their contents. Other cases where duties
generate other duties may arise. In all such situations, however, it is important to
distinguish between descriptions of acts with moral status and descriptions of states
of affairs providing context for those prescriptively considered acts. The mandate
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tests provide a useful mechanism for dismissing those parts of act-descriptions that
lack deontic status. Any case in which actions A and B are subject to (PDE)’s
legitimate application will clearly involve considering A and B prescriptively, and
thus pass Castañeda’s test.
In the end, (PDE) survives criticism, but in a somewhat weaker sense than its
original presentation. The dilemma actions A and B are each considered
prescriptively in their individual statements, but no formulation of either will
involve a prescriptive account of the other. This is because the actions are only
contingently incompatible. A’s incompatibility with B is contextual to B’s deontic
status. “I do A, after which I cannot do B” entails “I do not do B,” but the pairing fails
the mandate test. This makes sense, since “A & B” dilemmas are more intuitively
plausible than “A & ~A” dilemmas exactly because the actions have no intrinsic
connection when considered deontically. Likewise, I am unable to execute both A
and B through any available course of action, but my forbearance of each is a causal
result of my performance of the other, so instrumental inheritance fails, as well. One
can have one’s deontic cake and eat it, too, since I have preserved most of (PDE)’s
usefulness while eliminating its effect on contingent dilemmas.
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion and Implications

I have thus far discussed what are widely regarded as the strongest
structural critiques of dilemma-producing moral theories. If these arguments were
to succeed, that would imply any theory that tolerated genuine dilemmas had an
inconsistent basis. The arguments in the preceding chapters attempt to expose
contradictory results of dilemmas. If dilemmas have contradictory results, any set of
ethical theorems that accommodate dilemmas will imply the same contradictions. I
have argued that we do not have adequate reason to accept the axioms of
agglomeration and ought-implies-can as logically fundamental to ethics. That is to
say, there may exist logically consistent ethical theories that exclude these axioms.
In the second argument, I acknowledged that both the principle of deontic
consistency and the principle of deontic entailment were sound logical analyses of
basic moral reasoning. The principle of deontic entailment should not apply to every
sort of modal conditional, however. Rather, I argued that the scope of the principle
was specifically classical logical entailment. After clearing up some possible worries
with that interpretation, I concluded that the principle of deontic entailment still
gave us much of what we needed in terms of its application to promises and generic
versus particular actions. Though causal results do not inherit deontic status, an
action may be required or forbidden if it is causally instrumental to fulfilling or
violating an obligation. A logical analysis of this inheritance would require a formal
logic of ability and instrumentality. It is not within the scope of this project to
develop such a system. Regardless, any such system would not categorize horns of
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dilemmas as instrumentally related. Rather, forbearing the action required by one
horn of the dilemma is a regrettable result of the same actions instrumental to
fulfilling the other.
If the reader is at least convinced that it is plausible to deny those axioms I
have discussed (or the relevant applications thereof), then she has reason to reject
them as axioms, since axioms by definition capture fundamental logical laws. If the
logic of imperative ethics does not require these principles, they have their place as
potential theorems within specific ethical theories. They should not be taken as
foundational to a basic logic of ethics applicable to any theory, which is required to
judge the consistency of an entire theory. If one rejects these axioms and accepts
that dilemmas are possible, what comes next? The notion of genuine, irresolvable
dilemmas goes against certain of our intuitions about moral responsibility and
culpability. Questions of blameworthiness arise. One will wish to know just what
sorts of moral attitudes one should have to dilemmas and dilemmatic choosers. I
will here address these questions, and attempt to provide a satisfactory account of
the conceptual status of dilemma-producing theories.
I will begin by giving a more concrete example of just what qualifies as a
dilemma. Such a situation must involve two equally powerful obligations, each
individually inescapable (at least given the agent’s possible courses of action). An
agent finds himself in a situation where he must choose one or the other of the two
actions, and cannot take both. The actions must not be logically antithetical to one
another, but only contingently incompatible. A few of the examples I have discussed
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previously may fall under this description, but I will offer one that I believe
illuminates the important aspects of dilemmas.
Consider the following: Edward is kidnapped and knocked unconscious. He
awakens to find himself in a room with two other people. One is his nephew, the
other a total stranger. They are both tied up. Edward finds on his person a gun and a
note signed by the kidnapper. The note commands him to kill the stranger, or else
the kidnapper will kill Edward’s nephew, who is wearing a collar capable of
delivering a lethal (but minimally painful) shock. If the collar is removed, it will
explode, killing everyone present. Edward has ten minutes to make his choice, after
which time the kidnapper will release whomever remains alive. The signature
identifies the kidnapper as a notorious criminal. His reputation makes Edward
confident that the contents of the note are true and that the criminal will fulfill his
promises.
Edward obviously has an obligation not to kill. Under any plausible moral
theory, he will also have an obligation to rescue his family members from serious
harm or death. I claim that it is at least plausible that neither of these obligations
overrides the other in this case. The most likely reasons the reader might give if they
think Edward cannot have both obligations are the following: Edward cannot fulfill
both obligations, so it does not make sense to suppose that neither can be
overridden. This would certainly be true if both the agglomeration principle (OA &
OB ⊃ O(A & B)) and the ought-implies-can principle were to hold. I have argued that
neither is fundamental to the logic of ethics. As long as the reader accepts that a
logically consistent moral theory could reject one or the other (or both) of these
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principles, the reader cannot maintain that Edward must be able to discharge one of
his duties in this case. Up to plausibility, theories need not adhere to these
principles, and so they need not reject dilemmas. I do not suppose that Edward
follows any particular moral theory, in order to consider the ramifications of his
situation under theories that admit dilemmas.
The other possible reason to say that Edward cannot have these obligations
in conjunction is to say, “If Edward refrains from killing a (presumably innocent)
stranger, Edward will bring about his nephew’s death. Since he must refrain from
killing the stranger, Edward must bring about his nephew’s death. However, Edward
obviously has a duty to rescue his nephew. This is a clear contradiction, since
Edward is both required and forbidden to take the same action (namely bringing
about his nephew’s death). As the reader will recall from the last chapter, however, I
argued against an interpretation principle of deontic entailment whereby one
action’s causing another and the first action’s obligatoriness implies the resultant
action’s obligatoriness. Given that the principle should only be taken to apply in
cases of logical entailment, Edward’s obligation not to kill the stranger does not
imply an obligation to bring about his nephew’s death. Were he to refrain from the
killing, he would in fact be violating his obligation not to allow his nephew to die.
It can be assumed that either person’s death (the stranger’s or the nephew’s)
will have roughly the same effect on the world, in terms of loved ones who grieve
and goods that will never be achieved. One might contend that Edward’s obligations
to his nephew are stronger than those to strangers, but it is also plausible that
Edward’s obligation not to kill is stronger than his obligation to save a life. On

70
balance, the obligations seem to be at least roughly equally pressing. In short, this
case is an example of a genuine moral dilemma. Moreover, this example accurately
represents many of the difficulties in dealing with dilemmas. The first point to
notice is the tragedy of the situation, and the sense of Edward’s being forced into an
impossibly difficult choice. In this particular example, a second agent is responsible
for creating the dilemma. One could imagine cases where Edward finds himself in a
similar predicament, but no person is to blame for his position. Alternatively, there
are numerous examples of agents getting themselves into dilemmatic situations. I
will discuss just such a case shortly.
Consider Edward’s possible courses of action in this case. Assume he has no
hope of escaping without playing the kidnapper’s game. He has just the two choices,
then. He can shoot the stranger, saving his nephew. In that case, he commits a
murder, and it does not seem a stretch to say that he wrongs the stranger. I will
explore just what it means to wrong an individual shortly. In this case, it coincides
with an all-things-considered moral wrong, since Edward has an all-thingsconsidered obligation not to kill, and he violated that obligation. Suppose Edward
kills the stranger. Given that this is a true instance of a moral dilemma, Edward has
acted wrongly in a certain sense; he has committed a wrong. On the other hand, it
seems strange to say that Edward is guilty of anything besides choosing one of two
equally abhorrent alternatives given him. If anyone is at fault in this situation, the
kidnapper is the obvious choice. Can a dilemma-producing theory fully deflect moral
responsibility onto the kidnapper, though? Can it? Let us first consider the other
alternative.
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Suppose Edward cannot bring himself to kill the stranger. He declares this,
and the kidnapper electrocutes Edward’s nephew. Again, Edward has wronged
another person, this time a member of his family. He has also committed an allthings-considered wrong in allowing his nephew to be killed. In this case, too, it
would seem harsh to consider Edward fully culpable for his action. We may even
praise the character of a man who is unable to bring himself to kill another.
Certainly we would not want to cultivate the opposite instinct. Instead, we regret
that the decision had to be made in the first place and seek to place blame for its
inception, rather than its execution.
How might Edward feel after taking either of these courses of action? We, as
neutral parties may find it obvious that he is not guilty in the same sense as he
would be if he killed someone (or let someone die) in other circumstances, but
Edward will likely be haunted by his choice, whichever course he ultimately takes. If
he kills the stranger, he will then live with the knowledge that he was the direct
cause of an innocent person’s death. In particular, he may blame himself for being
the sort of person who could pull the trigger in that situation. At the very least, this
will be a terribly painful memory, perhaps even similar to other memories Edward
may have of times he violated (presumably less drastic) moral imperatives.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Edward allows his nephew to die. He will then
carry with him the knowledge that he was unwilling to do something drastic and
wrong to save a loved one. It is not hard to imagine that this memory will also be
painful, and likely lead Edward to blame himself for neglecting his duty to his family.
This feeling again may even feel comparable in force to the regret one has when one
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violates some minor moral rule (donating less to charity than one ought, or lying
when there is no real need, for example).
Are Edward’s feelings apt? Certainly we do not want to blame him for his
choice in the same way we would blame him for a similar action in a non-dilemmatic
situation. It seems like a moral theory that admits dilemmas could (and perhaps
should) maintain some mechanisms for assigning blame and admonishment for
wrongdoing, however. Presumably, such mechanisms will be connected in some
way to the violation of moral duties. It clearly cannot be a simple one-to-one
relationship, however, since that would entail that violating the duty not to kill in
Edward’s tragic case would carry the same weight of blame and admonishment as
would the same violation in less restrictive situation. I will here discuss what we
ought to make of blame in theories that allow dilemmas, along with how it might be
different to self-blame rather than assign blame as external parties. I will also touch
on certain related issues, including questions of punishment and moral character,
especially as they connect to blame and dilemmatic agents.
The first question that arises in considering these subjects is just how to
define “blame.” As it is understood in most philosophical literature, blame is “a
response to moral agents on the basis of their wrong, bad, or otherwise
objectionable actions or characters” (Tognazzini and Coates 1). Blame is interpreted
variously as an objective judgment of character, especially as it aligns with an
agent’s own moral views (Haji 197), as an evaluation (against some standard of
excellence) of an agent’s own qualities “manifested in thought and action” (Watson
231), and as strictly interpersonal judgments, separate from any metaphysical
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justification (Hieronymi 115). These are classified sometimes as “cognitive theories
of blame,” as they hinge on judgments or evaluations, rather than emotions
(Tognazzini and Coates 1.1). Alternative views focus on holding agents responsible
by reference to reactive moral emotions (Wallace 18) and adding to a belief that an
agent did wrong a desire that they do otherwise (Sher 112). Theories like these are
called “emotional” and “conative,” respectively (Tognazzini and Coates 1.2; 1.3).
It would be outside the scope of this project to argue extensively for a
particular theory of blame. I will attempt to avoid the tensions between these views
where possible. Despite this, I will rely on one particular distinction in the literature
on blame. Kenner argues in a 1967 paper against Smart’s strictly cognitive view of
blame. In the response, Kenner draws a distinction between use and application of
“blame” and “blameworthy” (247-248). “Blame” in its ordinary use expresses an
emotional attitude toward a regrettable or frustrating result. It need not imply a
moral evaluation (Kenner 239-240). “Blameworthy,” on the other hand is more
cognitive. Kenner claims that it is “a simple statement of moral condemnation”
(248). I maintain that the term is slightly more complex than this, as “blameworthy”
is not merely an expression of the moral undesirability of an action or poor moral
character of an agent. It carries with it a certain weight, and may indeed imply a sort
of moral grade or a rational desire for the agent to have done otherwise. In short,
blameworthiness is closer to a cognitive or conative account of blame, whereas
common usage of “blame” is often an expression of causal connection along with a
certain negative emotional response.
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What bearing do theories of blame have on my example with Edward’s
dilemma? When we understand what blame is and how it operates, it becomes much
easier to determine its application to specific situations. Is blame an apt reaction to
wrongdoing in dilemmas? Are dilemmatic agents blameworthy, and if not, would
blaming them be in some way unfair? In most cases of wrongdoing, we do not
hesitate to assign blame, and we typically consider our blaming attitudes to be
justified. That is to say, when I am wronged or violated, I am apt to blame the
offending party, and when I believe that wrong had a moral component, I consider
my blame well-placed. Blaming someone for her actions seems less appropriate in
situations where she was not in full control of those actions, however. Kenner
touches somewhat upon this issue when he argues that we can blame a compulsive
but incompetent driver for accidents he causes, but we cannot blame a man who has
a heart attack while driving (241-242).
Thus, there is a certain sense in which unavoidable actions cannot be subject
to blame. If an agent truly has no choice in his action, and his restriction is not the
result of some prior negligence or weakness of character, then we are inclined to say
that he must not be blamed. Kenner maintains that we expect people to avoid
certain dispositions, like compulsively driving cars if one is inept at driving. This
view motivates a somewhat stricter requirement to release an agent from blame.
One can blame an actor whose involuntary or unavoidable action arose out of a
situation that one would normally expect the actor to avoid, but not when the actor
was in the situation through no fault of his own. This allows one to explain and
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corroborate the intuition that one can blame irresponsible agents when their
negligence gets them into situations where they cannot help but cause harm.
This approach will run into problems as we consider more carefully what
falls into the realm of reasonable expectations. Are people with diagnosable
behavioral disabilities to be blamed for negligence of character? It would seem
unfair to say so. In any case, Edward’s situation is not quite like those. Edward finds
himself forced, through no fault of his own to choose a course of action that, under
certain plausible moral theories, will be morally wrong. Which choice he makes has
little moral significance, since each is wrong, and the two duties are equally
pressing. Whichever course he takes, however, he has made some choice. If he kills
the stranger, he has elected to do so. A course of action was available to him in
which he would not commit that murder. Likewise, if he lets his nephew die, he is
electing not to follow a path that would result in his nephew’s rescue. The task
before us is to make sense of just how Edward is and is not free to choose in this
case.
The reader may already have noticed that it would be fairly straightforward
to say that Edward was not free to do otherwise than he does if we could formulate
his duties and actions disjunctively. If we are to blame him for the wrong act of
either killing a stranger or letting his nephew die, then we are clearly in the wrong.
Edward could not but take one of those actions, so he could not avoid taking the
action consisting of their disjunction. It is not clear that this move would be valid,
however. Just as the agglomeration of duties fails to stand against counterexamples,
we cannot interpret choices disjunctively. The problem here is plain when one
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considers the ramifications of making obligations disjunctive. Suppose I have an
obligation to care for my family to the best of my ability and a separate obligation
not to murder. If one construes these obligations as disjunctive, it becomes obvious
that that approach is untenable. I could fulfill the obligation to take either of those
actions by taking one action and not the other. If we claim, as I suggested, that one
could interpret the disjunctive obligation as dismissing the individual ones, we must
say that that result is correct. But of course this is not the case. I may well have this
disjunctive obligation, just as Edward may well be obligated to either save his
nephew or the stranger, but each individual obligation remains in force. Thus, the
problem of Edward’s blameworthiness remains.
Unfortunately for Edward, he finds himself in a peculiar situation where he
can choose not to do any particular wrong (and so will be blameworthy when he
does violate an obligation), but he cannot help but do some wrong (and so may
presumably be exonerated of blame). It is unclear what to make of a situation in
which someone violates an obligation but does not deserve blame for it. Any sense
of “obligation” under which this was true would be quite a weak one. What is at play
here then is not excuse from blame entirely, but rather a distinction between two
types of blame one might assign. It will be important to be clear in exactly what
actions and consequences Edward is responsible for. In this particular case, some
blame will land with the kidnapper, as one would expect. I will also address how one
ought to interpret this discussion as it applies to cases where a dilemma arises
separately from any agents’ actions.
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In Edward’s case, he is responsible for the death of whichever of the victims
he chooses not to save. His actions guarantee the person’s death, and the victim
would not die if Edward did not take that particular action. Whichever action he
takes will amount to a killing, either directly killing the stranger or by failing to save
his nephew when it was within his power to do so. He is clearly not responsible for
bringing it about that some obligation is violated, however. In this particular case,
the kidnapper is responsible for that. Because of his actions, one of two people will
certainly die, and if he acted otherwise, neither would presumably be in any danger.
It is entirely possible that in other examples of dilemmas, no one will be
responsible in this way. It is only because Edward’s circumstances are the result of
someone’s actions that any party is blameworthy for this second-order wrong. If
there were no kidnapper, we would say that Edward’s finding himself in this
situation was an unfortunate and tragic matter of circumstance, but his own moral
situation would be unchanged. His situation would still constitute a dilemma, so he
would still be responsible for his actions as much as in the actual case. He would not
fill in the kidnapper’s role, however. The question of whose fault it is that he finds
himself in such dire straits would have a simple answer: “nobody’s.” What remains
in this investigation is to work out just how blame might be assigned, and how to
interpret the different sorts of blame at play for Edward’s and the kidnapper’s
actions.
Hieronymi, following Strawson, locates the assignment of blame in
judgments of ill will toward others on the part of the offending party (120). Many
moral theories are more concerned with actions and effects themselves than with
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will, and so when blame has a moral component, it may well involve judgments and
attitudes toward actions rather than states of the will. In Edward’s case, it would
seem strange to claim that he bore ill will toward either of his fellow kidnapping
victims. On Hieronymi’s view, Edward would presumably be free of all blame, unless
we interpret “ill will” quite loosely. This view is attractive, especially since it
exonerates Edward and accounts for the fact that his obligations are owed to the
particular people involved. He may have a general obligation not to kill, but the
particular wrong he commits under either choice is against an individual who has a
certain moral claim against him. However, many moral theories will consider
actions that cause harm to be wrong even when unaccompanied by ill will. In such
cases, agents may well be blamed who had no particular feelings toward the victims
of their actions. In Kenner’s case of the incompetent driver, for example, it is safe to
assume that the guilty man bears no ill will toward the victims of his crashes.
Nonetheless, he is culpable for his negligence and invites blame when he does
wrong.
It may seem attractive to say that the difference lies not in an agent’s
malicious intent, but in the direction of the duties in question. Edward has particular
duties to each of his fellow kidnapping victims. The kidnapper has similar
obligations, but he may violate an undirected obligation not to bring about more
wrongdoing. In that case, one might say that Edward is culpable for wronging
whichever person he kills, but not blameworthy in an objective sense. Then the
wronged party and any peripheral parties affected will have grounds to blame
Edward and seek recourse, but he should perhaps not be judged morally bankrupt
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in the same way he would be were he responsible for getting himself into the
situation to begin with (I will discuss that possibility in greater detail shortly).
It will be helpful to consider how this sort of blame might work. If the
culpable agent were not in a dilemma situation, one would of course be inclined to
blame him for his transgressions, regardless of who was wronged. This blame has
two components. It involves a judgment that the agent acted in a way that indicates
poor moral character, as well as an emotional feeling of indignation on behalf of the
wronged party. The first component involves an objective judgment. One blames in
this sense when one holds the blamed party responsible for violating some duty in a
case where they could have avoided doing so. The second sense of blaming does not
suppose an all-things-considered wrong is committed. It consists in a sense of
personal connection or empathy with the wronged party, and the feeling of
indignation is rooted in the victim’s being violated. This emotional reaction may
come alongside an indictment of character or call for redress against the culpable
party, but it does not constitute a judgment.
Dilemmas are peculiar under this view. If the only difference between these
two types of blaming is whether an all-things-considered wrong is committed, then
Edward is worthy of both under those theories that hold his case as genuinely
dilemmatic. An obligation does not amount to much if its violation does not invite a
judgment of morally wrong action. Thus, when Edward violates an obligation by
choosing which of his fellow victims to kill or let die, he renders himself
blameworthy in both senses I have outlined. He is clearly less worthy of indictment
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than one who willfully does wrong, however. What force is at play that mitigates
one’s blaming Edward?
The missing piece here is sympathy. It is specifically because of the tragic
nature of Edward’s situation that one is disinclined to blame him fully for his
actions. When one considers Edward’s situation, one recognizes the difficulty of his
choice and the fact that he cannot but do wrong. We do not suppose that a perfect
moral agent would do otherwise than Edward does, since neither action is
preferable to the other. Thus, one can blame Edward for his choice, whichever that
is, without indicting his character or calling for redress on behalf of the wronged
party. One still judges that Edward acted wrongly, and whatever his particular
action, one maintains that he would avoid certain specific negative effects had he
acted otherwise. Nonetheless, one cannot hold an attitude of righteous judgment
against Edward because he had no choice but to render himself blameworthy in
some respect.
I will turn now to the other party involved: The kidnapper. He carries the
weight of the most serious moral violation in this example, but my focus has been on
Edward. As it should be: This is a project concerned with moral dilemmas, not
kidnappings. The kidnapper is important to the moral narrative in my example,
however, because he brings it about that Edward becomes a dilemmatic chooser.
Obviously, the kidnapper is wrong for kidnapping his victims and for subjecting
them to such severe psychological trauma. What interests me in this case is his
responsibility for Edward’s actions. Is the kidnapper only to blame for his crimes as
a kidnapper and torturer? Or does he share guilt for Edward’s choice in the
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dilemma? Often, when we imagine a moral dilemma, it is a situation where an agent
faces a tragic choice because of some unfortunate circumstance, or else because she
got herself into the predicament. I believe that shifting the responsibility to a third
party more clearly illuminates how moral culpability operates in these situations,
and inform our approach to other types of dilemmas.
We have a strong intuition that the kidnapper is really behind Edward’s
wrongdoing. There are two possible ways to approach assigning culpability here.
First, one could say that Edward’s wrongful actions are really the results of the
kidnapper’s actions. Whichever wrong Edward commits, it may as well be the
kidnapper’s hand pulling the trigger or the kidnapper’s words condemning the
nephew to die (in the latter case, the kidnapper is also literally responsible for
delivering the lethal shock. I am considering whether he is also culpable for
Edward’s failure to prevent the death). On the other hand, it could be that the
kidnapper is culpable for a separate evil. It will be simple in most moral systems to
defend an obligation not to force others to violate moral duties. In that case, the
kidnapper is not responsible for Edward’s actions, but he is responsible for the
wrongful act of forcing Edward to take some immoral action.
The first formulation of the kidnapper’s culpability quickly runs into
problems. The reader will recall the previous chapter where I argued that mere
causal results of actions do not necessarily inherit obligatory status from the
incipient act. In this case, the kidnapper’s actions causally entail Edward’s choosing
one or the other horn of his dilemma. The immorality of Edward’s options need not
run backward through time, however. The kidnapper’s actions are not instrumental

82
acts for Edward, so they do not inherit moral status in the same way pulling the
gun’s trigger is forbidden because shooting the stranger is. It is also important to
note that the kidnapper does not command Edward to take either course. In that
case, assuming Edward took the prescribed action, the kidnapper would be
responsible in the same way a general is responsible when his troops carry out his
orders. Instead, what the kidnapper does is ensure that Edward will commit some
wrong act by forcing him into a dilemmatic choice. Whichever act Edward chooses,
that particular act is his choice, and not the kidnapper’s. However one looks at it, the
kidnapper’s actions do not guarantee a particular outcome, so he is not strictly
causally responsible for whichever harm is done.
The kidnapper’s wrongdoing is of the second sort. He is responsible for
forcing another person to make some immoral choice. If actions are wrong because
they violate the wills of their victims, then this is a particularly perverse thing to do.
What the kidnapper has done is not caused one or the other person to die, but
rather forced a man to compromise his moral character by himself committing a
moral violation. Here the question of culpability is straightforward: The kidnapper’s
action need not inherit its blameworthiness from Edward’s choice; rather, the act
itself is a violation. Edward has a right to moral indignation toward the kidnapper
for forcing him to do wrong, and the impartial judge has reason to chastise the
kidnapper, since he committed a severely wrong act in the face of numerous morally
acceptable alternatives. Edward’s choice is tragic because he cannot but do wrong.
The kidnapper has no such defense. He willfully violated a number of moral
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strictures, not the least of which was forcing another person to stain his moral
history.
It seems quite straightforward to say that the kidnapper is culpable for his
wrongdoing, including the particular action of forcing Edward to make an
impossible moral choice. Consider now a related example. Suppose Edward knows
the kidnapper’s game, and rather than being accosted, he requests to participate.
Perhaps he wishes to learn how a psychopath’s mind works, or perhaps he simply
wants to know whether he has it in him to murder a stranger in order to save a
loved one. Suppose also that the kidnapper had already kidnapped the other two
people involved, so Edward is not implicated in their capture. Rather, upon learning
that his nephew will be involved in one of these games, Edward decides to test
himself.
In that case, Edward is largely responsible for forcing himself into an
immoral choice. Of course the kidnapper has committed a number of morally
abhorrent acts, but the particular crime of forcing Edward to choose either of two
unacceptable alternatives falls on Edward’s own shoulders. When the kidnapper
forced him to choose, the kidnapper invited the blame for causing another person to
compromise his own moral character by choosing to do wrong. Now, it is Edward
who is forcing himself to compromise his moral fiber.
Is Edward blameworthy for this self-violation? Certainly we wish to blame
Edward more severely than in the case where he is kidnapped, but is it correct to
say that he has wronged himself? To say so would dismiss the strong intuition that
he has done a greater wrong by those whom he inevitably harms because of his
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actions. We are not concerned with Edward as a victim in this case, but rather with
the perversity of choosing to later choose to harm some other person. In this case,
we might actually say that the initial choice is instrumental to the dilemmatic
violation. This view does not quite capture what is going on, however. We need not
suppose Edward intends either choice he eventually makes from the outset. He
might not even be able to reasonably predict what he will do when the time comes.
Rather, he is culpable because he makes a choice ensuring he will later do wrong.
We might now invoke the logical-necessity interpretation of the principle of
deontic entailment. If we let “A” stand for “Edward chooses to enter a dilemmatic
situation” and “B” for “Edward commits some all-things-considered wrong action,” it
is quite clear that A logically entails B. Eventually doing some all-things-considered
wrong is central to the definition of entering into a dilemma. Thus the antecedent of
(PDE)’s main conditional holds: £(A ⊃ B). For this particular case, we will need the
contrapositive: £(~B ⊃ ~A). Then the relevant instance of (PDE) is this: £(~B ⊃
~A) ⊃ (O~B ⊃ O~A). O~B holds by definition, since B is specified to be all-thingsconsidered morally wrong. Thus, O~A follows. Here we see that A is not forbidden
because it compromises Edward’s character. Edward himself is the only person who
can perform the action A, and by performing it he would void the very strength of
character that appears to be in jeopardy. Rather, A inherits its deontic status
because forbearing from A is a logically necessary condition of forbearing from B.
Edward is blameworthy in this case for committing a moral violation he had every
opportunity to avoid. His choice in the dilemma is no different from the choice he
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made when forced into the situation. When he elects to enter the dilemma, however,
he violates a distinct but related obligation not to do what entails a further violation.
In analyzing Edward’s situation, I have paid special attention to blame. The
difficulty of assigning blame to dilemmatic agents is, I believe, one of the greatest
conceptual strikes against dilemma-producing theories. We naturally associate
blame and wrongdoing, and the former seems to require that the blamed party have
some option to act to avoid blameworthiness. In clarifying this matter, I have served
a double purpose. Those who are attracted to dilemma-producing theories may
have a clearer idea of how to approach the subject in application, and those who rely
on blame as an argument against dilemmas’ admission into ethics may find
themselves in need of a new tack.
Over the course of this project, I have explored what I take to be the most
compelling arguments against dilemmas on the grounds of consistency. The
intuition that dilemmas cannot be allowed in a consistent system of action-guiding
principles has some weight. It is supported by several candidate axioms of deontic
logic, which together would indeed show dilemmas to be inconsistent. What I have
shown is that these axioms are not in fact fundamental to the project of formalizing
ethical claims, and so should only be admitted on independent theoretical grounds,
rather than taken as axioms of every admissible deontic logic. When these principles
are shown to be fallible, the formal arguments against dilemmas fail. I have now also
demonstrated that blame can be understood and used meaningfully within theories
that admit dilemmas. Without defending any particular normative position, I will
end on this: It may be fruitful to further exploration in ethical theory if theorists
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consider the value of accepting dilemmas and weaken the restrictions so often put
in place to ensure that obligations be never in conflict.
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